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iABSTRACT
This study discusses the National Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic towards
the Russian minority after 1991. In the first chapter, the Soviet Nationality Policy
and History of Settlement of the Russians into Kyrgystan were examined. The
central part of the study is the second chapter, which focuses on the National
Policy of the new independent state, and Social Organizations of Kyrgyzstan
People’s Assembly, including Slavic Foundation. Hereby, according to local
sources, Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly’s function, structure, Congresses; and
Slavic Foundation’s role and works were analyzed. The last chapter deals with the
main problems of the Russians in the Republic such as bilingualism, dual
citizenship, and migration.
As a result, this study shows that the national policy of the Kyrgyz Republic
towards the Russian minority is rationally positive since the Russians living in
Kyrgyzstan have a full right for developing their history, culture, and customs; the
status of Russian is an official language in the Republic; and social organizations
and Slavonic-Kyrgyz university are established to support the Russian minority in
Kyrgyzstan.
Key words:  The National Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic, The Russian minority in
Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly.
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ÖZET
Bu tezde, 1991 yılından günümüze Kırgız Cumhuriyetinin kendi sınırları
içindeki Rus azınlığına dair Ulusal Politikasından söz etmektedir.  Birinci
bölümde, Sovyetler Birliği dönemindeki butun uluslara uygulanan Ulusal Politika
ve Rusların Kırgızistana yerleşme tarihçeleri incelenmiştir. Tezin ana bölümü olan
ikinci bölümde ise yeni bağımsızlığını alan devletin Ulusal Politikası, Kırgız Halk
Meclisin Sosyal Örgütleri ve bunlara dahil Slav Vakfına odaklanılmıştır. Bu
bölümde, yerli kaynaklara göre Kırgız Halk Meclisin görevi, yapısı, kongreleri ve
Slav Vakfının rolü ve çalışmaları da analiz edilmektedir. Son bölümde ise
Kırgızistandaki Rusların ana dillerini kullanım hakları, çifte vatandaşlik ve göç
gibi temel olgular ele alınmaktadır.
Kırgızistanda yaşayan Ruslar’ın kendi tarihini, kültürünü ve geleneklerini
geliştirme haklarına sahip olmaları, Rusça’nın resmi dil olarak ilan edilmesi ve
Kırgızistan’da Rus azınlığı desteklemek amacıyla Sosyal Örgütler ve Slav-Kırgız
Üniversitesi’nin kurulması aşamalarını gösteren bu çalışma, Kırgız
Cumhuriyetinin Rus azınlığına olan Ulusal Politikası’nın destekleyici olduğunu
savunmaktadır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Kırgız Cumhuriyeti Ulusal Politikası, Kırgızistan’deki Rus
azınlık, Kırgız Halk Meclisi
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1INTRODUCTION
On August 31, 1991 the Kyrgyz Republic declared its independence. It was the fall of
the Soviet Union that presented this chance1. However, independence meant not only
to be sovereign in political, economic, social, and cultural development but also
brought various problems for the new independent state. One of the problems that
Kyrgyzstan met was the national question. At the end of the 1980s, Kyrgyzstan
unlike many other ex-Soviet republics appeared as a multinational republic where the
percentage of indigenous people was approximately equal to the percentage of other
nationalities. That is, the Kyrgyzs consisted of 52,3% of the population.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the percentages of non-Kyrgyz nationalities have
started to decrease and the titular nationality has grown. In other words, most of the
Russians, the other Slavs, Germans, Jews, Tatars, and other nationalities left
Kyrgyzstan to move to Russia, Germany, Israel, and other countries. Most of these
migrants were motivated by the belief that the national policy of the new independent
Kyrgyzstan would be unfriendly, accepting Kyrgyz as the basis of nationality.
However, the most important reason of migration was economic situation in the
Republic rather than ethnic.
                                                
1 Kyrgyzstan did not want to leave the USSR and today agrees that life was much more better during
the Soviet times than today because there was certainty, security, and jobs. See in L.Handrahan,
“Gender and Ethnicity in the ‘Transitional Democracy of Kyrgyzstan”, Central Asian Survey,
2001,20(4), p. 468
2Since the beginning of its independence, the Kyrgyz Government, taking into
consideration the multiethnic structure of population, did not prefer the policy that the
Kyrgyzs could be a leading nationality.
The Republic established all national attributes after 1991, but declared Kyrgyz
language as the state language before independence in 1989. In spite of these
alterations, Kyrgyzstan stayed away from the policy that the titular nationality could
be a dominant one. This means that the Kyrgyz Government has chosen
“internationalism” for solving the national question.
In this thesis, “internationalism” is used as a term determining the policy of solving
the national question by considering all nationalities in the Kyrgyz Republic as equal
nationalities, which can fully enjoy the right to develop their language, traditions,
history, and culture. From my point of view, the Kyrgyz National policy is somewhat
pursuing ex-Soviet nationality policy, at least theoretically, namely
“internationalism” towards all nationalities in the Republic. However, I also argue
that the current Kyrgyz National Policy brings some improvement to the ex-Soviet
Nationality policy, in that sense that it brings a full right of development of other
nationalities’ values such as language, traditions, and culture.
Concretely, in this thesis, I examine Soviet Nationality policy according to eras,
Kyrgyz Nationality policy after 1991, the Russians’ position in the Republic, and
their problems.
In order to study the subject, this work is divided into three chapters.
The first chapter focuses on the Soviet Nationality policy since the former Kyrgyz
Soviet Socialist Republic experienced the Soviet Nationality policy. This chapter
3mainly deals with policies such as “Russification” and “Internationalism” in the
frame of the Soviet Nationality Policy. The Soviet Nationality policy is considered
according to the historical periods of the different Soviet leaders. Moreover, it
examines the settlement of the Russians in Kyrgyzstan from a historical perspective.
The second chapter of this thesis is the main part of the research. It concentrates on
the National Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic after 1991. Since Kyrgyzstan People’s
Assembly (KPA) mainly reflects the national policy of the new independent state, the
assembly’s foundation, structure, and congresses are considered. Furthermore,
“Slavic Foundation in Kyrgyzstan”, one of the social organizations at the assembly
that represents interests of the Russians and the Russian-speaking, is examined in the
second chapter.
The last chapter deals with main issues of the Russian minority in Kyrgyzstan, the
status of Russian language, dual citizenship, and migration of the Russians from
Kyrgyzstan to the Russian Federation are studied.
The thesis examines the national policy in Kyrgyz Republic through an analytical
perspective. Therefore, surveys carried out at Congresses of Kyrgyzstan People’s
Assembly are provided as appendixes at the end of the thesis. Surveys give additional
information about political, economic, social situation of the nationalities in the
Republic; opinions and estimations of different nationalities, including the Russians,
about the National Policy of the Kyrgyz Government; and also about policy’s
problems that are essential.
This research is descriptive and case study research. I have chosen this topic because
it is attention grabbing to make out the National Policy of the new independent state
4after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In other words, the question that stands in
my mind was: Which kind of policy has Kyrgyzstan chosen towards nationalities
living in the Republic after 1991?
Why the Russian minority? There are two key reasons for studying the Kyrgyz
Nationality policy towards the Russian minority after 1991. The first one is that the
Russians were the second largest nationality in the Republic until the beginning of the
1990s; second, the Russians still have kept their role as an important nationality in the
Republic similar to the Soviet times.
As the Soviet Nationality Policy has been repeatedly revised in the history of the
Soviet Union, this research does not aim to discuss it in detail. Since 1991, Western,
local, and Russian scholars from different perspectives have examined the Kyrgyz
National Policy. Most of the Western scholars’ research shows that Kyrgyzstan has
not identified its national policy, as it had never had a national history2. Whereas,
some local scholars claim that Kyrgyzstan has identified its national policy choosing
a democratic way of solving the national problems. For instance, A. Elebaeva and N.
Omuraliev assert that as Kyrgystan is a multinational state, it has preferred “state-
community” form for establishing the national policy3. To put it clear, Kyrgyzstan
People’s Assembly, an extra-parliamentary body comprised all social organizations
and national-cultural centers is considered as a community form for instituting the
national policy. Yet, the Kyrgyz Government is a state form for setting up the
                                                
2 L., Handrahan, p. 470; Eugene Huskey, “Kyrgyzstan: the politics of Demographic and Economic
frustration”, in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras ed., New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet
Nations, p. 656
3 Ainura Elebayeva, Nurbek Omuraliev, Rafis Abazov, “The shifting Identities and Loyalties in
Kyrgyzstan: the Evidence from the Field”, Nationalities Paper, Vol.28, No2, 2000, p. 170
5national policy. Thus, Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly and the Kyrgyz Government
together form ‘state-community” form for establishing the Kyrgyz National Policy.
While various scholars have been analyzing the Soviet Nationality Policy
extensively, the Kyrgyz National Policy has been rarely examined by few scholars
such as A. Elebaeva, N. Omuraliev, N. Kosmarskaya, V.Bogatyrev. There is no book
written about the Kyrgyz National Policy, all publications related to this issue are
articles. Consequently, the issue of the Kyrgyz National Policy towards the Russian
Minority has not been studied with the exception of N. Kosmarskaya. In her article,
“Russkie v Suverennom Kyrgyzstane: Dinamika Mneniy I Povedeniya (1992-98)”,
she analyzes the situation and perspectives of the Russians in Kyrgyzstan after 1991,
the status of Russian language, the dual citizenship, and Kyrgyz nationalism towards
the Russians. Her research is also mostly based on the implementation of surveys in
the Republic. According to Kosmarskaya, the Russians in Kyrgyzstan feel
psychologically comfortable4. If the Russians leave Kyrgyzstan it is only because of
the economic reasons, states Kosmarskaya. For her, the most significant problem for
the Russian minority in the Republic is the “policy of cadres”. Kosmarskaya
concludes that the position and perspectives of the Russian minority depends not only
on the Kyrgyz Government but also on the Russian Government.  In other words,
Kosmarskaya thinks that political and economic stability is the most significant
aspect for the Russian minority, they may prefer to live in Kyrgyzstan if the Kyrgyz
                                                
4 Natalia Kosmarskaya, “Russkie v suverennom Kyrgyzstane: Dinamika Mneniy I Povedeniya 1992-
1998”, in Kyrgyzstan : Nekotoyie Aspekty  Sotsial’noy  Situatsii, Institute of Regional Studies,
Bishkek, 2000, p. 19
6Government provides with these conditions, the Russians may leave Kyrgyzstan if
the Russian Government provides with economic and political stability in Russia5.
In general, there are many books and articles related to the Russians in the post-
Soviet Republics and their situation after the dissolution of the USSR. However, most
of them deal with migration, language issues rather than the political situation of the
Russians as minority.
The sources and secondary literature used in the research come primarily from the
following fields: Russian, English, and Kyrgyz newspapers, magazines; and books
from Bilkent and the Kyrgyz National Libraries. Numerous materials about
Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly, its Congresses, including surveys were taken and
used from the documents and brochures issued and published by Informative-
Research Center of the assembly, and the Kyrgyz National Academy of Sciences.
The status of Russian language, the dual citizenship, and migration of Russians were
studied mostly by using periodical materials. Most useful materials regarding the
Russian language in the present study were articles of N. Kosmoraskaya, N.
Portnova, S. Zhigitov, and N. Megoran’s. However, there are few materials that deal
with dual citizenship. It seems this is because of the lack of the progress in this issue.
About migration of the Russians, there are a lot of materials. Accordingly, the most
valuable materials used in this thesis were: A. Kokorin’s and A. Gorenko’s, “State
and Its Ethnic Policy: New Decrees of the Kyrgyz Republic – Step to the
Stabilization of Migratory Processes”; A. Elevaeva’s, N. Omuraliev’s, and R.
Abazov’s, “The Shifting Identities and Loyalties in Kyrgyzstan: The Evidence from
                                                
5 Ibid., p.23
7the Field”; Jivoglyadov’s, “Migratsiya – eto kogda liudyam hochetsya ne tol’ko
uehat’, no I vernutsya”; N. Kosmarskaya’s, “Ethnic Russians in Central Asia – A
Sensitive Issue? Who is Most Affected? (A Study Case of the Kyrgyz Republic)”; N.
Omarov’s, Migratsionnye protsessy v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike v gody nezavisimosti:
Itogi Desyatiletiya.
Furthermore, interviews were taken with the chairman of the Institute of Ethnic
Policies, Valentin Bogatyrev on September 2000, and the responsible secretary of
Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly, Alexei Fukalov on August 2003.
8CHAPTER I
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1.1 The Soviet Nationality policy
The Soviet Nationality policy has been extensively discussed both during and in the
aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR. However, controversies about the Soviet
Nationality policy still occupy the academic agenda. In this chapter, I will discuss the
Soviet Nationality policy examining the questions such as what the Soviet Nationality
policy was and how it was represented during the USSR period.
In order to discuss these questions, I will consider the issues such as “Russification”
and “Internationalization” as they are keys to examine the Soviet Nationality policy. I
will elaborate these issues by examining the politics of the Soviet leaders such as
Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev and the others. It is known that the Soviet Nationality
ideology was invariable and grounded within the Marxist tradition6. Theoretically, the
Soviet Nationality policy aimed to create the “Soviet People”, whereas in practice it
diverted from building the ideals of Soviet society. It was also mixed and complicated
with policies such as “Russification”, “Indigenization”, “Industrialization” and other
policies. To put it clear, the Soviet Nationality policy had periodically been
represented by the so-called “Russification”, “Indigenization”, “Industrialization” and
                                                
6 Gerhard Simon, tr. Foster K., Foster O., Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the
Soviet Union, Westview Special Studies on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Boulder, Oxford,
1991; Helene Carrere d’Encausse, “Determinants and Parameters of Soviet Nationality Polivy”, in
Azrael Jeremy R., ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, PRAEGER Publishers, Praeger
Special Studies, New York, London, Sydney, Toronto, 1978; Robert Conquest ed., Soviet Nationalities
Policy in Practice, The Bodley Head, London, 1967, pp. 15-20.
9other policies, and had also been diverted from the basis of the Leninist nationality
policy.
Some historians such as Robert Kaiser, Ivan Dzyuba claim that the Soviet Nationality
policy aimed to “russify” all nationalities and the Russians dominated over other
nationalities. Whereas other historians, such as Lee Schwarts, Geoffrey Hosking,
Viktor Kozlov, Gerhard Simon assert that “all nationalities had the same type of
social structure and the principle of equal rights and equality of nationalities had been
established in all areas of society”7. In other words, the Soviet nationality policy   had
the aim of denationalizing, centralizing, homogenizing, and amalgamating the
nationalities, but not ‘Russifying” all Soviet culture and history8.
According to Kaiser, Dzuyba, the Soviet Nationality policy proclaimed in one and
practiced in other. To put it clearly, the Soviet Nationality policy was supposed to
build ‘international equalization’ in theory, while in practice the Soviet Nationality
policy was kept up by “Russification”9.
For instance, Robert Kaiser argued that the Soviet Nationality policy was generally
based on “Russification” policy. For Kaiser, much of the “Russification” occurred
during the interwar period, and after the 1950s, the Russian language and culture
maintained their primacy throughout the Union10.
Lee Schwartz’s view on the Soviet Nationality policy is different from Kaiser’s
argument. Emphasizing that the former Soviet Union, as it emerged in 1922, was
                                                
7 Allworth Edward,ed., Soviet Nationality Problems, Columbia University Press, New York, London,
1971, p.30.
8 Ibid, p.43
9 Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, New Jersey, p. 393-4, details in pp.250-324’; Robert J. Kaiser in Robert Lewis, Geographic
Perspectives on Soviet Central Asia, London, New York, pp170-1, p. 177, pp.295-6.
10
viewed as a compromise between doctrine and reality, Schwartz argues that the force
of nationalism among the non-Russian people proved itself to be more powerful than
it was foreseen, leading to the eventual implementation of the federal compromise11.
In addition, Schwartz contends that the Soviet ideology hypothesized that the state
proceeded towards pure Communism, where nationality distinctiveness would go
down, ethnic conflict would diminish, and eventually, a new “Soviet man” would be
originated. Schwartz also confirms that this ideology was strengthened by factors
such as “equalizing levels of education, increasing numbers of intermarriage,
increasing use of the Russian language, and gradual diminishing of popular
expressions of nationality such as religion, literature, and folklore12. Consequently,
for Schwartz, the Soviet Nationality policy was sought to build ‘international
equalization’. Paul Golbe moves Schwartz’ argument a step further by claiming that
Soviet Nationality approach was nihilistic to all cultures, including the Russian,
which was “national in form, and socialist in content”13.
Unlike Schwartz’s and Golbe’s statements on the nationality policy, Ivan Dzyuba
points out that the Soviet nationality policy kept changing in content, illustrating
shifts till Brezhnev14.  Dzyuba lists these shifts as; Leninist nation-building in the
1920s; Stalin’s revision of the nationality policy in the early 1930s; Stalin’s
liquidation of national Party cadres in the 1930s; Stalin’s notorious repression of
                                                                                                                                          
10 Ibid.
11 Lee Schwartz, “Regional Redistribution and National Homelands in the USSR”, Henry R.
Huttenbach, ed.,  Soviet Nationality Policies: Ruling Ethnic Groups in the USSR,, Mansell Publishing
Limited,London,New York, 1990, p. 125
12 Ibid, p. 126
13 Paul A. Goble, in Rachel Denber ed., The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context,
Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1992, p. 98
11
entire nationalities during and after the war; the restoration after the XX Party
Congress of the rights of the nationalities liquidated under Stalin; the extension of the
rights of Soviet Republics, accompanied, however, by a number of subjectivist
chauvinist measures taken by Khrushchev, especially in the field of education.
While Dzyuba contends that the nationality policy was shifted to “Russification”,
Geoffrey Hosking states that the policy was not really “Russification” but rather
“Sovietization” or “Communization”15. According to him, the Soviet Nationality
Policy concerned “subjecting all nationalities, including the Russians to the
centralized political control of the party and to the economic domination of the
centralized planning apparatus”16.
Among these opinions, I agree with Schwartz’s’, but my approach about the Soviet
Nationality Policy is also that, in practice, it was somewhat diverted from its
ideology, that is, mixed with “Russification”, in particular, under Stalin’s rule.
Consequently, my opinion does not mean that the Soviet Nationality Policy was
aimed to “russify” all nationalities or it continued for the duration of the whole Soviet
time.
1.2 Assumptions on the Collapse of the Multinational Empire
About two hundred nationalities and cultures existed in the former Soviet Union.
According to the Third All Union Soviet Congress (May 20, 1925), the population of
the USSR at that time included between 146 and 188 different nationalities and ethnic
                                                                                                                                          
14 Ivan Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem, New
York, Monad Press, 1974  p.
15 Geoffrey Hosking, A History of the Soviet Union 1917-1991,Fontana Press, 1992, p. 259.
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groups, with 104 to 200 distinguishable languages spoken17. Also, the first Soviet
census, carried out in 1926, listed 188 different nationalities with significant racial,
cultural, geographic and linguistic differences18.
When the multinational union was proclaimed some historians as unrealistic
considered it because the multinational empires such as Hubsburg and Ottoman
collapsed. This showed that growth of nationalism could lead to the fall of empires.
Richard Pipes argued that before the collapse of the Union, the multinational empire
might fall apart roughly along the lines of the fifteen republics, which are now new
independent states19.
In relation to the problem of nationalism in the Soviet Union as a factor, Kaiser
argues that nationalization process was still underway in the North Caucasus, Central
Asia, Siberia, and Far East although it was stated that the process of national
consolidation had been basically completed 20.
Thus, from the beginning of the establishment of the Union, there were suppositions
on the collapse of the multinational empire. Although the Soviet Union aimed to
create a homogenous nation called “Soviet people”, it failed.
                                                                                                                                          
16 Ibid.
17 Lee Schwartz, p.126
18 Ibid., p.127
19 Gail Warshofsky Lapidus, “Ethnonationalism and Political Stability: The Soviet Case”, in Rachel
Denber ed., The Soviet Nationality Reader: The Disintegration in Context, Westview Press, Boulder,
San Francisco, Oxford, 1992, p. 421
13
1.3 “Russification” or “Internationalization”? : Politics of the Soviet leaders
1.3.1 Lenin’s theory of the nationalities
Lenin’s nationality policy was grounded on Marxist theory. He wanted to build a
‘proletarian universal state’. People’s Commissariat of Nationalities, “whose mission
was to develop a policy of cultural advancement as proof that the Russian majority
was no longer to attempt Russifying” was founded under Lenin21. Lenin used the
Marxist slogan, “no nation can be free if it oppresses other nations”22. He wrote that a
socialist revolution alone was not enough to guarantee international integration, and
he supposed that actual equalization in the socio-cultural, economic, and political
spheres would take a longer time, possibly   a generation or more, since a socialist
victory only provided nations with legal equality23. Lenin saw actual equalization as a
key component to solve the national problem inherited from the tsarist Russia.
Moreover, the leader viewed proceeding to ‘international equalization’ as the
significant factor in his nationality policy. For Lenin, ‘international equalization’ was
a necessary precondition for the assimilation of nations into one ‘Communist people’,
which was the ultimate goal of Marxists. This equality was necessary not only in the
socio-economic sphere but also in the cultural and political spheres. Marxist slogan
used by Lenin was implied characteristics of Russian dominance as an ‘oppressor
nation’ in the multinational empire. Dzyuba argues that Lenin’s whole struggle was
                                                                                                                                          
20 Robert J. Kaiser, p. 11
21 Cited from Edward Allworth, p.50
22 Cited from Robert J. Kaiser, p. 97
23 Robert J. Kaiser, p.97
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directed against Russification, Great Russian Chauvinism, and Great Power
ideology24.
The most important part of Lenin’s nationality policy was his preference to the right
of nations to rule their own “homelands”. According to Pipes, Lenin supported self-
determination because of his belief in implementing all prerequisites of a good
socialist solution of the nationality question25. Lenin was for the right of nations to
self-determination, arguing that it does not mean an actual separation, and declaring,
“separation is altogether not our scheme, we do not predict separation at all”26.
Nevertheless, shortly before his death Lenin realized that “the right of nations to self-
determination” far from benefiting a ‘proletarian universal state’ and it would lead to
threats.
As a result, Lenin and the Bolsheviks had two principles:
1) The Socialist state should be a unitary state;
2) Proletarian internationalism could allow no room for national differences and
aspirations.27
Pipes, however, emphasizes that Lenin’s approach to the nationality question was
insufficient as the situation in the country and the nationalities were not ready, and
even they did want neither assimilation nor independence.
In relation to Lenin’s nationality policy, I agree with Helene d’Encausse who states
that Lenin’s “policy towards national groups was motivated both by the ideology of
                                                
24 Ivan Dzyuba, p. 43
25 Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964, p.43
26 Richard Pipes, p. 45
27 Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, PRAEGER Publishers, Praeger
Special Studies, New York, London, 1978, p. 39
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egalitarianism and by the goal of national unification”, and his policy had to attain
“two contradictory ends: to maintain equality among the nations and to strengthen the
Soviet state, that is, Soviet control over the nations”28. Accordingly, in theory, there
had to be a balance between “two contradictory ends”; however, in practice “Soviet
control over the nations” prevailed “equality among the nations” and broke down the
balance. Therefore, my viewpoint on Lenin’s Nationality policy is that it only
lingered as a Leninist theory.
1.3.2 Leninist Theory and the Soviet Leaders’ politics on the Nationality
Question
Even before the death of Lenin, Joseph Stalin replaced him. Stalin was in favor of
“Sovietization” but he did some changes in the Leninist policy29. In order to achieve
“friendship of nations” (druzhba narodov), Stalin initially put “Indigenization”
(korenizatsiya) in the Leninist policy. For Stalin, the primary means of achieving
“Sovietization’ in the non-Russian periphery were “Indigenization” of cadres in
socio-cultural, economic, and political institutions in each national territory in an
effort to create ‘indigenous elites’ who would be loyal to the center30.
Stalin arranged a hierarchy of recognition among the Soviet nationalities by a
separate flag, a republic anthem, a written constitution, and an encyclopedia in its
                                                
28 Helene d’Encausse, The Nationality Question in the Soviet Union and Russia, Scandinavian
University Press, 1995, p. 17
29 According to Stalin, “Sovietization” was giving superiority to the Russians in the USSR. George
Liber, Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923-1934,
Cambridge University Press, 2001; http://books.cambridge.org/0521522439.htm
30 Robert J. Kiser, p. 105; Korenizatsiya means something like “taking root”, from the Russian koren,
“root”, see Gerhard Simon, tr. Foster K., Foster O., Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities
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own native language31.  He defined the nation as “historically evolved, stable
community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up
manifested in a community of culture”, which meant that if any of these
characteristics were absent then the nation would cease to be a nation32.
Stalin’s view on administrative division was different from Lenin’s vision. According
to Stalin, administrative division rather than national-cultural division was the only
Marxist way of solving the nationality problem in the Union. For him, administrative
division instead of national-cultural would serve to break down national barriers and
encourage international integration. Though, administrative division supported by
Stalin was not equal to national sovereignty and Stalin strongly opposed to the right
of nations to self–determination.
Practically, there was a division of views, between Lenin and Stalin over the
formation of the Soviet Nationality policy. As it was mentioned before, in order to
overcome confrontation with nationalities such as Ukrainians, the Central Asian
peoples, and the Caucasians, Lenin was against Russian dominated and Russian
centered union. On the contrary, Stalin was in favor of the state essentially composed
of one large unit, Russian centered, with the intention of avoiding nationality
problems. Stalin’s nationality policy “raised the Russian nation to the first rank,
exalting its traditions and culture”33. For example, on the celebration victory of World
War II, Stalin declared that “Russia is the leading nation of the Soviet Union…in this
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the Soviet Union 1917-1991,Fontana Press, 1992, p.244.
31 Edward Allworth, p. 32
32 Robert J. Kaiser, p. 8
33 Helene Carrere d’Encausse, p. 28
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war, she had won the right to be recognized as the guide for the whole Union”34.
Therefore, Carrere d’Encausse asserts that equalization policy diminished and an
“elder brother”, the Russian people to guide all nations, emerged35.
Stalin’s death did lead to soft changes in the Soviet Nationality policy. The next
leader, Khrushchev renewed Stalin’s korenizatsiya policy and somewhat
reconstructed Stalin’s nationality policy.  For example, when Stalin had deported
many nationalities to the East, immediately after the end of World War II36,
Khrushchev rehabilitated the Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushi, Karachai and Balkars,
omitting the two deported nationalities: the Germans and the Crimean Tatars. The
Germans were released in 1955 and the Crimean Tatars in 195637.  Thompson states
that Khrushchev softened the assimilation tone of the Communist Party Program38.
Khrushchev allowed Soviet citizens to use their own languages, thinking that this
would also lead to the voluntary practice of Russian in the growth of nationality
relations. Concerning the concept  ‘Soviet nation’, he declared:
In the USSR, a new historic community of people of various nationalities having common
characteristic traits has been formed – the Soviet nation. Soviet people have: a common
motherland – the USSR; a common economic base – the socialist economy; a common
socio – class structure; a common worldview – Marxism – Leninism; a common goal –
construction of communism; and many common spiritual and psychological traits39
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Nevertheless, some historians like Martin McCauley, Edward Allworth state that
Lenin’s nationality policy, that is, ‘proletarian internationalism’ had not been
implemented in practice. In other words, historians claim that the Soviet Nationality
policy remained Russian centered policy. McCauley affirms that Khrushchev’s
nationality policy was not liberal. According to him, Khrushchev wanted Russian to
be the key for the renewal of the Soviet Union; that Khrushchev was angry when
Azerbaijan and Latvia rejected Russian language for their children and feared that
their own language would overwhelm Russian language40. More to this point, Edward
Allworth emphasizes that after 1956, the times seemed less unsafe for the
nationalities, compared with the 1917-1956 period, which was characterized as
unstable, drastic actions in nationality policies. For Allworth, there was still political
pressure to use the Russian language over every group, and the period 1956-1964 was
a time of hesitation for the survival of nationalities and religious denominations in the
Soviet Union41.  Therefore, Helene d’Encausse claims “Khrushchev quickly
discovered that de-Stalinization was encouraging the demands of local nationalists
rather that fostering internationalist consciousness, this discovery prompted him to
return to the idea of an internationalist utopia”42.
The replacement of Khrushchev by Brezhnev brought no considerable changes in the
Soviet Nationality policy. According to Allworth, during the period of Brezhnev
(1965-1982) there were not essential changes in the nationality policy because
Brezhnev believed that there were no problems in the nationality policy, and he
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declared ‘old nationality problems stemming from legal discrimination and economic
inequality had been removed forever’43.
Thompson, however, argues that Brezhnev was anxious about the policy of
assimilation and thought that the basis for the assimilation was economic policy44. On
the word of Thompson, policy of “Sovietization” means homogenization of society
through economy and culture. Consequently, concerning cultural policy, Thompson
states that Brezhnev’s cultural policy between 1965-1968 was supporting neither the
favoritism shown to Russian nor the free development of nationality languages
alluded by Khrushchev45. He asserts that between 1969-1972 Brezhnev’s nationality
policy had become stronger, in particular regarding the Ukraine and Georgia, with an
extra focus on the Russian language:
The rapid growth of internationality ties and cooperation has led to a heightened significance
of the Russian language, which has become the language of mutual communication of all
nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union. And, comrades, the fact that Russian has
become one of the generally recognized world languages has pleased us all46.
During this period, some republican secretaries had also supported the use of Russian
language as a vehicle of communication and preservation of integrity.  Kirgiz
Communist Party’s First Secretary Usubaliev described the knowledge of Russian as
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‘powerful weapon’ of communication and a source of unity, asserting that learning
Russian was ‘an objective requirement’ for all Soviet people47.
Thus, Brezhnev’s nationality policy showed no significant changes from the previous
leaders’ nationality policy. Brezhnev’s policy remained as a national unification and
the assimilation factor that could promote Russian language.
Dzyuba, in Internationalism or Russification, although emphasizes that a number of
difficulties and ambiguities in the nationality policy remained unclarified and some
principles, undefined, “and most important of all, that all too often practice does not
conform to theory”48.
After Brezhnev, Andropov was the next leader of the Soviet Union, in whose era; the
national problems were considered as not yet solved49. Andropov unlike the previous
leaders mainly focused on Lenin’s theory on nationality question. In his speeches he
supported Lenin’s view on the self-determination right of nations and opposed to the
“Russification” policy50. On the other hand, it should be marked that Andropov had
been the leader of the Union for a short time. Therefore, it is difficult to determine
how much his speeches were truthful51.
In addition, Maxwell claims that Andropov was the first leader who appeared as a
reformist in the Soviet Nationality policy. Maxwell’s argument depends on explicit
declarations of Andropov such as “there existed problems and outstanding tasks” in
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the Soviet nationality policy, which must be solved; “life shows that the economic
and cultural progress of all nations and nationalities is accompanied by an inevitable
growth in their national self-awareness”52.
Rachel Denber also explains that Andropov appeared to be calling for the formulation
of an explicit, coherent, and comprehensive strategy in which the nationality question
stood at the very center53. Similarly, Henry Huttenbach pointed out that Andropov
called, for the first time, for the formulation of a “well-thought-out, scientifically
substantiated nationality policy”54.
During the last years of the Soviet Union, before its dissolution, Gorbachev came into
power as a reformist, not only of the Soviet Nationality policy but also whole system
of the Union. Gorbachev’s nationality policy was considered liberal compared to the
other Soviet leaders’ nationality policy.
The reformist from the beginning refused the thesis that the nationality question had
been ‘solved’ in the Soviet Union.  This can be seen from Gorbachev’s speeches as
well. Although Gorbachev considered the Soviet nation as “a qualitatively new social
and international community united by their economic interests, ideology and
political goals”, he identified that there existed problems in the nationality
development55.
Gorbachev’s language policy favored double language policy. He was for both
learning native language and Russian language. He asserted in his writings that
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‘everybody needs Russian language, and history itself has determined that the
objective process of communication develops on the basis of the language of the
biggest nation56.  His insistence to learn the native language was based on his belief
that even the smallest ethnicity could not be denied the right to its native language57.
Thompson argues that Gorbachev’s nationality policy was moderated. According to
Thompson, the national unrests occurred in the Baltic republics, Central Asian
republics, and the Caucasus region had influence on the reforms of Gorbachev.
Indeed, those national disorders have started at the time of Gorbachev’s regime and
showed that the nationality question had never been solved.
As a result, examining the Soviet Nationality policy shows that the nationality policy
from the beginning had controversies between “Russification” and
“Internationalization”. The Soviet Nationality policy was grounded on Marxist
doctrine but it was only in theory and it was never practically based on the Marxist
tradition. In fact, all Soviet leaders were convinced that by achieving the
“Sovietization” they would avoid the nationality problems or the nationality question
could be ‘solved’ by itself   during the process of building Communism. Any of the
leaders did not seriously take the nationality question into consideration. However,
Andropov was marked as a first leader who emphasized that there were troubles in
the nationality question. Gorbachev, of course, appeared as a reformist, claiming that
there were empty beliefs in attaining the ‘imagined system’.  Therefore, many
historians consider the aim of establishing the ‘Soviet people’ as an unrealistic policy.
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1.4 Settlement of the Russians in Kyrgyzstan58
Settlement of the Russians in lands, which are now Kyrgyzstan, had started since the
expansion of the Russian Empire in the 1850s and 1860s. The first Russian presence
in the region was military in essence. Paul Kolstoe argues that the military attendance
of the Russian army greatly influenced the creation of the future Russian diaspora59.
In a while, the Tsarist Russia established political control over the present Central
Asia60. Moreover, the Russian colonial authorities embarked on a major effort to
reorganize agriculture in the region, especially to promote the growth of cotton.
Consequently, first settlers were peasants as they were dispersed in the Central Asian
region by the tsar’s order.  Initially, most of the Russian peasants first migrated to
northern Central Asia, and then they moved in the South of the region.  Kolstoe
asserts that in the agricultural regions further south, the Russian presence before the
turn of the century was very limited in the Ferghana Valley (the South part of the
region), that it was making only 0.5% of the population, and that this changed
incredibly through time: while only 50.000 Russians lived in Central Asia in 1858,
forty years later the number had increased tenfold61.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, from 1902 to 1913, Gene Huskey
emphasizes, in northern Kyrgyz Valleys, what is now the Chu and Issyk-Kul regions,
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the indigenous population declined by almost 9 per cent, while Russian settlers
increased by 10 per cent62. Also, the most of the Russians settled in the cities where
Kokand forts had once stood, among these was Pishpek, which had 14.000 residents
by 1916, 8.000 of them were Russians63. In Kyrgyz lands the settlement of the
Russians reached its peak during the years of 1907-1912, and by 1916 it had reached
1.5 million, or 14.3% of the population64.
Period
Voluntary Involuntary Total
(Numbers in
thousands)
1801-1850
1851-1860
1861-1870
1871-1880
1881-1890
1891-1900
1901-1910
1911-1914
125
91
114
68
279
1,078
2,257
696
250
100
140
180
140
130
25
27
375
191
254
248
419
1,208
2,282
723
Table 1. Number of Voluntary and Involuntary Migrants into Asiatic Russia (Siberia, Turkestan, and
Asiatic steppe region (North Kazakhstan)) 1801-191465
                                                                                                                                          
61 Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, Hurst & Company, London, 1995, p.23
62 Gene Huskey, “Kyrgyzstan: the Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration”, in Ian
Bremmer and Ray Taras ed., Nations, Politics in the Soviet Successor States, Cambridge University
Press, 1993, p.399
63 Ibid.; Pishpek, later was changed into Frunze, most recently changed into Bishkek, the present
capital of Kyrgyz Republic.
64 Paul Kolstoe, p.23
25
Thus, the migration of Russians, the majority of whom were peasants, reached its
peak during the first decade of the twentieth century. Kaiser argues that deliberate
migration between 1901 and 1910 surpassed the total eastward migration for the
entire nineteenth century, even though it was restricted by the famine of 1901-1902
and by the legal controls between 1904 and 190566. According to Kaiser, in 1910 with
a good harvest in the west, migration reached 41 per cent, while in 1911 with a
particularly bad harvest in the east it reached 44.5 per cent67.
Moreover, with the development of transportation facilities   obstacles to migration
were reduced.  Construction on the Trans-Siberian railroad began in 1891, and thirty-
three hundred kilometers of road were constructed by 1900. A railroad from Russia to
Tashkent was opened during the 1890s68. By 1916, about sixteen thousand kilometers
of roadway had been constructed in Siberia and Central Asia69.
 Based on the fact that there was a substantial increase of Russians migrated into non-
Russian nationality areas, in particular, urban areas, Kaiser outlines that the Russians
had been becoming more geographically dispersed throughout the country between
1926 and 1939 years70. Consequently, migration of the Russians had contributed even
after the falling down of the tsarist regime. Schwartz contends that many of the
Russian population had been moving into the peripheral and internal non-Russian
territories over a century. For Schwartz, since Stalin’s time the Soviet Union had
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administratively organized migration on the basis of the national distribution of the
population71.
The migration policy had led to a mixture of different nationalities in the Soviet
republics, in particular, in the Central Asian republics. In fact, the policy of mixing of
the nationalities in the Soviet Union was characterized by “urbanization” and
“industrialization”. In other words, “urbanization” and “industrialization” of the non-
Russian republics were the major causes of mixing of the nationalities, which proved
the implementation of the “Sovietization” policy. It is uttered that in the 1960s the
greatest “urbanization” and “industrialization” had occurred in non-Russian areas,
particularly Central Asia, Belorussia, and Moldavia72. This can be seen at the
population figures of those years, that the population of Central Asia increased 44 per
cent between 1959 and 197073.
However, Russians embraced the most numerous group living in the cities and there
was very little local migration from countryside to town. Therefore, job opportunities
in urban areas were being pre-empted by Russians74. “Industrialization” was
implemented only in the cities populated by the migrated Russians, whereas
countryside and villages remained populated by indigenous people who continued
their “traditional life style”75.
There was correlation between “industrialization” and migration of the Slavs into
non-Slavonic areas. The large influx of Russians was identified as a reason of the
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lack of the qualified local labor force to fill the new urban jobs. By 1970, the
Russians comprised the greater part of the total urban population in both Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan76.
In the Soviet history, the approaches such as the socio-economic and the ethno-
political were classified as the causes of migration of the Russians into non-Russian
areas. The socio-economic approach was supported, as it was believed that migration
of the Russians into non-Russians republics would lead to social and economic
progress that also would help to avoid the national problems. Similarly, the ethno-
cultural approach was promoted because of the acceptance that the diffusion of the
nationalities throughout all Soviet territory would solve the national problems.
Walter Kolarz has a different view on migration policy of the Soviet Union.
According to Kolarz, the Soviet migration policy was “a planned colonization
policy”. Supporting the socio-economic approach, Kolarz concludes that the primary
approach of the Soviet regime towards colonization was for economic and strategic
purposes, but it was not a national Russian one77.
Nevertheless, a large number of the Russians settled into Central Asia, including
Kyrgyzstan. As it was mentioned before, the Russian migration started in 1850s and
continued almost to the end of the 1970s.
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CHAPTER II
 THE NATIONAL POLICY OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
AFTER 1991
2.1 Principles of the National Policy of the Kyrgyz Government
Today more than eighty nationalities live in Kyrgyzstan. In the beginning of its
independence it was different from other Central Asian republics with its small
percentage of indigenous population that was, approximately, the same with the
percentage of different nationalities; relatively the ratio of indigenous people is 53%
and 47%. As it was elaborated in the historical chapter, in Kyrgyzstan European
nationalities as well as Asian nationalities are settled for more than a century.
Different policies and different powers have mixed all nationalities in Kyrgyz lands,
additionally Soviet officials artificially created the present territory of the Republic.
After attaining its independence in 1991, Kyrgyzstan as all former Soviet republics
has met difficulties during its political, economic, and social development. One of the
most important difficulties Kyrgyzstan met was the nationality question. Not only
dissolution of the Soviet Union has exacerbated the importance of the nationality
question, but also transition to democracy has raised challenges to the national issue.
In other words, emergence of plural societies leading to political struggle and
polarization of nationalities has led to challenges to the interethnic affairs78. The
significance of this was also observed with the dramatic events in Osh, tension
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between the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyzs, which was seen as the beginning of ethnic
clashes. Kyrgyz researchers suggest solving interethnic disagreements at the state
level, since states are able to comprehend interests of different societies and ethnic
groups; regulate interethnic co-relations; and serve people civil peace and consensus.
With regards to the national policy of the Kyrgyz Republic, studies carried out so far
state that it should be based on new socio-political realities emerging in the Republic,
and it should create real conditions and reliable guaranties for the free development
of all nationalities in the state.
However, according to Kosmarskaya, the national problems in Kyrgyzstan show
positively dynamics on the day-to-day level79. On the other hand, even if the Kyrgyz
Government has declared that the nationality question has democratically been
solved, the Kyrgyz National policy can be somewhat interpreted as continuation of
the Soviet Nationality policy.
Today, tentatively, the basis of the national policy of the Kyrgyz Government is a
concept of international accord80. The main goal of this policy is a consolidation of
all nationalities living on the Kyrgyz territory. According to Elebaeva, Omuraliev,
and Abazov, this goal has been established for several reasons. The first reason is that
Kyrgyzstan is a heterogeneous state (in 1991 the Kyrgyzs composed of
approximately 52% of the population, the Russians - 22%, the Uzbeks - 13%, and
another nationalities about 13% of the population). Second, at the beginning of the
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1990s interethnic clashes occurred in the southern region of the Republic. Third, the
Kyrgyzs themselves were short of national cohesiveness and customarily
characterized themselves “as members of different tribes or tribal groups with district
dialects, dress, and political affiliations”81.
Nationalities 1926
   %
1959
    %
1970
   %
1989
   %
1998
    %
Kyrgyzs
Russians
Ukrainians
Uzbeks
Kazakhs
Tatars
Germans
Others
   66,7
   11,7
     6,4
   11,1
    0,2
    0,5
    0,4
    3,0
   40,5
   30,1
    6,6
   10,5
    0,9
    2,7
    1,9
    6,8
   43,8
   29,2
    4,1
   11,3
    0,7
    2,3
    3,0
    5,6
   52,3
   21,5
     2,5
   12,9
     0,9
     1,6
     2,3
     6,0
   61,2
   14,9
    1,5
   14,4
   0,92
    1,3
    0,3
    5,7
Table 2. Ethnic Trends in Kyrgyzstan in the following years82
Moreover, Elebayeva, Omuraliev and Abazov argue that the national policy of
Kyrgyzstan is founded on the development of a Kyrgyzstani identity where all
citizens would be loyal to the newly independent state; unified within the territory of
the nation state in the Kyrgyzstani nation, and the multicultural nature of the society
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would be maintained83. However, this does not mean that the national policy of
Kyrgyzstan seeks to develop Kyrgyzstani nation, as the Kyrgyz republic has never
experienced to establish Kyrgyzstani identity. Moreover, it had been more than
seventy yeas under the Soviet Union, where the national policy was also unclear, in
the sense that it aimed “Internalization” but was mixed with “Russification”, and
generally was labeled “Sovietization”. Therefore, Kyrgyzstan, being a part of the
Soviet people, has faced difficulties in founding its national policy. It seems that
today the national policy of the Kyrgyz Government is much more towards mature
“Kyrgyzstan people”, with the aim of sustaining multiethnic and multicultural
society. Consequently, it may be claimed that the idea of the Soviet nationality policy
is somewhat preserved in the new independent Republic since the national policy of
Kyrgyzstan based on the maturity of “Kyrgyzstan People” and loyalty of all
nationalities to the republic are very similar to the aim of establishing the “Soviet
People” and loyalty of all nationalities to Soviet Union.
Lori Handrahan states that this similarity, in other words, continuation of the Soviet
nationality policy is natural since unlike other former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan
did not have a national history84. Moreover, after attaining its independence,
development of nationalistic parties and movements were prohibited by the Kyrgyz
Government. Even the President of the republic characterized making law on Kyrgyz
language as just one state language, as mistakenness85.  In his words:
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In the early years of independence, among a rapid rise in national awareness, its role was if
not ignored, at any rate, pushed to the background…the erroneousness of the positions of
those who advocated the promotion of just one state language: Kyrgyz.
2.2 Endeavors of the Kyrgyz Government to found Peaceful Multinational
Society
Since 1993, the national policy of the Kyrgyz government has been reflected by
Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly (Assembleya Naroda Kyrgyzstana). It is declared that
formation and development of the Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly (KPA) represents a
“state-public” form of the Kyrgyz nationality policy. In other words, state presents its
power to social organizations of KPA, and they take responsibilities for supporting
and strengthening interethnic accord86. Elebaeva argues that actual support of
political structures, namely, the President; the Government to the Assembly is the
National policy of the Kyrgyz Republic87.
Officials’ claim also show that the policy of the Kyrgyz Government concerning the
ethnic groups is implemented to create a Kyrgyzstan that is a ‘homeland’ of its entire
citizen. Therefore, there is no restraint in the country on development of culture, arts,
education or media in the languages of all ethnic groups. Similarly, there is no
oppression over different religious communities that Islamic mosques and Orthodox
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and Protestant churches exist side by side and even the number of Orthodox and
Protestant churches is growing88.
Kyrgyz Government is sensitive to the language problems. Indeed, it can be argued
that Kyrgyz Government pays too much attention to the problems of the Russian-
speaking population, in particular, the Russians. Decree on the Measures for
Regulation of the Migration Processes in the Republic was issued to decrease
migration of Russian-speaking population. Moreover, Russian language was
proclaimed as an official language of the Kyrgyz Republic89. As it was mentioned
above, one of the reasons to preserve international harmony in the Republic were
ethnic tensions occurring in the southern region of Kyrgyzstan. Here, it should also
be noted that in the early 1990s, ethnic clashes occurred between locals rather than
anti-Russians or Slavs90. Nevertheless, Kyrgyzstan has generally endeavored to avoid
ethnic tensions. Megoran contends that Kyrgyzstan has avoided ethnic conflicts that
existed around its borders in Eastern Turkestan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan over the
last decade because it was able to tread a careful path asserting the repressed ethnic
identity of the Kyrgyz while seeking to develop a state with a strong and inclusive
civic identity91. Consequently, this argument also shows that the Kyrgyz Government
has ignored the Kyrgyz identity and chosen to develop a civic identity; that Kyrgyz
Government tried to establish peaceful multinational society. However, although the
Kyrgyz national policy aims to avoid clashes between ethnic groups and tries to
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develop civic society, this is not observed in practice. A clear example of this can be
the ethnic clashes that could not be avoided in Kyrgyzstan in the Batken incident of
August-November 1999, which was based on clear ethnic lines of Tajik, Kyrgyz, and
Uzbek. As a result of this Batken incident, Max van der Stoel, High Commissioner
for National Minorities with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), even gave a serious warning that Central Asia might soon become the “new
Kosovo”92.
2.3 Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly
Taking interests of the nationalities and ethnic groups into consideration, Socio-
political Council by the President aimed to protect interests and requirements of all
nationalities living in Kyrgyzstan, and also to create harmony between all
nationalities since first years of the state’s independence. The President of the
Republic called all social associations, namely national-cultural centers, national
associations to establish a kind of an extra-parliamentary body, Kyrgyzstan People’s
Assembly (KPA). Accordingly, the call of the President to establish KPA was
supported by social organizations and realized in 199393. Moreover, the slogan
“Kyrgyzstan is Our Common Home” (Kyrgyzstan – Nash Obshchiy Dom) was
initiated by the President of the Republic, and has gained popularity to represent the
National Policy of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR).
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According to the Declaration of KPA, the assembly is, first of all, a social
organization, which aims to express interests of all nationalities living in Kyrgyzstan.
Next, KPA seeks to consolidate nationalities, to unite all citizens of the KR, to
strengthen international friendship, to maintain civil peace and interethnic accord, to
help people in spiritual and cultural reviving, and to develop languages, traditions,
and customs of all nationalities in the Republic.  Additionally, the main tasks of the
KPA are stated in the following way94:
-    Strengthen international accord;
- Keep civil peace in the Republic;
- Realize interests of all nationalities;
- Reproach all nationalities in Kyrgyzstan;
- Call all nationalities to human values;
- Prevent conflict situations, confrontations, and extremism in interethnic
relations.
Also, it is declared that the assembly’s activities are carried out according to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Pact on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights and the Declaration of Rights for People belonging to National,
Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic minorities. To put it clearly, in the Republic, the basic
rights and freedom of human being are theoretically recognized and guaranteed in
                                                
94 Begaliev S., Omuraliev, A., Fukalov A., ed.,  XXI Vek – Vek Protsetaniya, Druzhby, i Konsolidatsii
Naroda Kyrgyzstana, Social Research Center under Department of Social and Economic Sciences of
the Kyrgyz National Academy of Sciences, Bishkek, 2000, p135.
36
accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law,
international treaties and agreements, and ratified by the Kyrgyz Government.
2.4 Social Organizations of Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly and the Assembly’s
Structure
In 1994, there were 16 social organizations in KPA, while today there are about thirty
organizations. According to the report of the third congress of KPA, social
associations in Kyrgyzstan were:
1. Community of the Uighurs of the KR “Ittipak”
2. Community of Jewish culture “Menora”
3. Association of the Turks of the KR “Asturk”
4. Common-cultural center of the Tataro-Bashkirs “Tugan-Tel”
5. Slavic Foundation in Kyrgyzstan
6. International community “Tugel’bay Ata”
7. Republic association of the Tajiks by Rudaki
8. Council of the Germans “Folksrat”
9. National-cultural center of Chechen and Ingush citizens of the KR
“Vaynakh”
10. Association of the Karachays “ Ata-Jurt”
11. Association of the Kurds “ Midiya”
12. Ukrainian Association in the KR “Bereginya”
13. Belo Russian Community “Svitanok”
14. Association of the Azerbaijanis “Azeri”
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15. Association of Dungans in Kyrgyzstan
16. Association of the Dagestan people in the KR “Sadaga”
17. Community “Turk-Ata”
18. Center of the Kazakh culture “Oman”
19. Community of the Greeks in KR “Filiya”
20. Association of the Armenians “Karavan”
21. Communal Unity of the Georgians “Mziuri”
22. The Uzbek Natio-cultural Center in the KR
23. Communal Unity of the Koreans
24. Fond “Mnogodetnaya sem’ya”
25. The Polish cultural-educational unity “Odrodzenie”
26. Chechens’ Cultural Center “Bart”
In addition, KPA has gradually extended its significance within the Republic. Four
branches of the assembly were opened in different regions of Kyrgyzstan, namely, in
Issyk-Kul, Osh, Jalal-Abad, and Talass region.
The executive body of KPA is the Council; the labor body of the Council is the
Presidium that consists of 11 members95. On the top of the assembly is the chairman.
From the foundation of the assembly to 2002, the chairman of the assembly was
Sopubek Begaliev; since November 2002 the chairman is Tokoev Isa.
Consideration of questions at the assembly are carried out by the following five
stages:
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- Consideration of questions inside the ethnic groups, diasporas;
- Consideration of questions among the ethnic groups, diasporas;
- Consideration of questions at the Presidium of the assembly;
- Consideration of questions with administrative and executive structures such
as the Kyrgyz Government, Ministries, Administration of the President;
- Consideration of questions with the President of the republic.
At the end of these stages, results of examined questions are concluded at Jogorku
Kenesh and the Government of the Republic96.
It is asserted that the assembly has also much influence on decision-making process
in the Kyrgyz Government97. Furthermore, the assembly plays an active role in the
policy of cadres, which is one of the significant problems in the national policy of
Kyrgyzstan. For this reason, the assembly has endeavored to solve this problem by
promoting deputies from different nationalities at the Parliament and local
governmental bodies of the Republic. Today, there are several representatives of
ethnic groups and diasporas, such as the Uzbeks, Russians, Karachais, Germans,
Ukrainians, and Kazakhs were elected as deputies to Jogorku Kenesh, who work at
Ministries and different departments of the Government98.
As it was emphasized before, every ethnic group is free in developing its values,
namely, traditions, customs, language, and culture. This is the main difference of the
Kyrgyz national policy from the Soviet nationality policy. In addition to this, the
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activities of KPA are based on the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic where basic
principles of the national policy are fixed by principles of equality for all citizens of
the Republic99. Consequently, it is possible to find every kind of information related
to activities and life of social organizations, ethnic groups, and diasporas in the
newspaper “South Courier”, (Iujniy Kur’er)100. Moreover, Informative-Research
Center was established in January 1996, and it publishes all works of the Assembly in
the bulletin “Ethnic World” (Etnicheskiy Mir). Since October 1997, the bulletin is
published in three languages (Kyrgyz, Russian, and English). On January 2003,
Informative Research reestablished into Institute of Ethnic Policies. Moreover, all
information about the assembly and current events are opened in the web page of the
assembly101.
All national-cultural centers celebrate their national holidays, festivals, and cultural
programs. Apart from these programs, the assembly has started informative activities
such as publishing researches, brochures, and books regarding ethnic groups and
diasporas. For example, 100 copies of the book, “Tatars in Kyrgyzstan”, (Tatary v
Kyrgyzstane); “From History of Correlations between Belorussia and Kyrgyzstan”,
(Iz Istorii Vzaimootnosheniy Belarusii I Kyrgyzstana); and 300 copies of the book,
“Greeks” (Greki), “Russian Language in Kyrgyzstan” (Russkiy yazik v Kyrgyzstane),
“Dungans” (Dungane), “Jews in Kyrgyzstan” (Evrei v Kyrgyzstane), “From History
of the Germans in Kyrgyzstan 1917-1999” (Iz Istorii Nemtsev v Kyrgyzstane 1917-
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1999), “Ethno-culture of Uygurs in Kyrgyzstan” (Etno-cultura Uygurov v
Kyrgyzstane), “The Koreans in Kyrgyzstan”, (Koreytsi v Kyrgyzstane) were
published102.
In June 1994, an international conference on problems in migration and ethnic issues
(Problemy Migratsii i Etnicheskie Voprosy) was held by the assistance of the
National Academy of Sciences of the KR. Moreover, several conferences, seminars
were organized by the assistance of the assembly and other organizations such as
“Democracy and Economic Development in Central Asia” and “Interethnic relations
and regional co-operation”. On May 2002, the conference “Multinational Kyrgyzstan:
tendencies and perspectives of development” was organized by foundation of Soros
in Kyrgyzstan. On April 2002, there was held Forum “Mir i Soglashenie – Osnova
Razvitiya Obshestva”. Additionally, on September 2002 the seminar
“Zakonodatel’stvo I zashita natsional’nyh men’shistv: mezhdunarodnye normyi I
praktika” was organized by High Commission for National Minorities103.
In September 1994,  “House of Friendship” (Dom Druzhby) was opened as the main
administrative center of the assembly in the capital, Bishkek. All social organizations
and Informative-Research Center of the assembly settled their offices at this house.
Today, it is the main building of all national centers.
It should also be marked that KPA has become a model for other former Soviet
republics such as Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Uzbekistan104. Each of
these states formed a different form of the assembly. For instance, Uzbekistan
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People’s Assembly partly belongs to the state; Kazakhstan People’s Assembly fully
belongs to the state, while Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly and the Russian Federation
People’s Assembly are not officially connected to the state.
Nonetheless, for Elebaeva, Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly is the unique leverage of
conducting interethnic relations as Kyrgyzstan in the beginning of the formation of
legal basis to develop interethnic relations.
Although Kyrgyzstan aims to build multiethnic society, labeling “Kyrgyzstan
People”, there are people who do not want to be ignored as the titular nationality in
the Republic and they do not support the President’s idea “Kyrgyzstan is our common
home”. The deputy of the legislative assembly of Jogorku Kenesh, Adahan
Madumarov claimed that “Kyrgyzstan is home of the Kyrgyzs, we may let other
nationalities in as renters of home, if they respect our history, language, and
spirituality105. Such disagreements with the idea were easily quieted down since they
were few.
2. 5 The Congresses of Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly
On December 10, 1993, there was Akaev’s decree to hold the first congress of the
assembly106. The aim of the congress was not only to strengthen friendship and
consensus among the nationalities but also to consider questions related to the
national affairs in the Republic. Consequently, the first congress of the assembly was
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held on January 21, 1994. President Akaev made the first speech, calling “People of
the Republic” but not “Peoples of the Republic”107. President outlined that all
nationalities have to be united since they share a “common historical destiny,
common anxieties, and common interests and aims”, indicating the past Soviet
experience108. Akaev gave a rough idea that there should not be division into “elder”
and “younger” brother, even though the Kyrgyzs are main “ethnos”, their language is
a state language, and the republic is called “the Kyrgyz Republic”109. Additionally,
the President stated that the Kyrgyzs tended to synthesize different cultures, which
was actually investigated by academician Bartold110. Akaev expressed his belief that
this character of Kyrgyz people would allow to establish maximum favorable climate
to all nationalities in the Republic. Likewise, he claimed that notwithstanding his/ her
nationality every citizen of the Republic has to know that he/ she is part of
Kyrgyzstan people.
President also mentioned about the status of Russian language, claiming that Russian
was the second language and will remain as the second forever111. He added that
Kyrgyzstan people have to learn English also as an international language.
Additionally, migration of nationalities such as Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, and
Jews, most of whom composed of engineers, technicians, employers of art were
emphasized. Akaev delineated that this problem is one of the significant problems in
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Kyrgyzstan and it is only because of economic crisis. In order to slow down the
migratory process, Akaev proposed to consider a dual citizenship.
Apart from the speech of Akaev, there were speeches of other participants of the
congress such as chairmen of social associations, academicians, employers of art, and
veterans. All speeches touched upon the same questions, namely, consolidation of
people in the Republic, official languages, dual citizenship, and migration.
On January 22, 1994, at the end of the congress, Declaration of Unity, Peace, and
Consensus was proclaimed. In the declaration there were principles such as:
- We are for co-building, consolidating, and flourishing our common home-Kyrgyzstan;
- We are for mutual respecting of spiritual values, traditions of every “ethnos”, every
nationality in the republic;
- We are for equality on realization and development of national-cultures of every nation and
nationality;
-  We are for equality and for a equal responsibility of all citizens for the Constitution-the laws
of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- We are for a national consensus for determining approaches of our state;
- We are for co-efforts that lead to flourishing and remaining Kyrgyz lands as our motherland;
- We are for a mutual tolerance, a mutual aid, and an interaction for the sake of our common
future.
As a result, according to these principles, the Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly was set
up.
The second congress was not very different from the first. It followed the same steps
as the first congress, like the congresses of the former Soviet Union.
On December 1, 1995, there was Akaev’s decree to hold the second congress of the
assembly. On February 17, 1996, the second congress was held and President made
the first speech where he put his emphasis to works done by the assembly for three
years, in particular, to KPA’s recognition and success amid the New Independent
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States (NIS)112.  Moreover, Akaev maintained that for the last years, migration
process from Kyrgyzstan into other countries was decreasing, which he interpreted as
people were more sure about their future. In fact, at that period there was decline in
the number of migrants, while after 1995, migratory process accelerated again.
President also pointed out that the main principle of the national policy of the Kyrgyz
Republic is to care about social-cultural and spiritual development of the ethnic
groups. For that reason, he noted that universities like Kyrgyz-Slavic University,
Kyrgyz-Uzbek Technological College, Kyrgyz-Turkish University “Manas”, and
International University of Kyrgyzstan were opened in the Republic.
Nevertheless, President said that at the congress they have to agree on the main
question - economy - as because economy is the root of all other problems emerging
among different nationalities113.
Chairman of the Assembly, Begaliev also drew attention to economic problems that
should be first of all to be solved in order to strengthen friendship, and keep peace in
the state. He stated that manufacturing spheres should be revived; people should be
involved in their works, and earn their wages in order gain their normal life standards.
Finally, Begaliev also referred to the assembly’s works for three years, and its
success in instituting good relations with international organizations.
Similar to the first congress, after the chairman’s speech, representatives of different
social associations addressed the assembly. At the end, the Declaration of Consensus,
Work, and Progress was proclaimed114.
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Similar to the practices under the Soviet Union, on March 26, 1999, the assembly
celebrated its five-year anniversary in order to consider the assembly’s success for
five years. At the anniversary, KPA’s contribution to the Kyrgyz Government at
working out language, migration issues, and solving disagreements in society were
emphasized115. The assembly was also considered as a good model for strengthening
interethnic relations, and keeping civil stability in the state. During the anniversary,
Kyrgyzstan’s leadership in establishing the assembly among all former Soviet
republics was also noted. President Akaev made the first speech. Emphasizing about
successes achieved by the assembly, he pointed out “we should not follow mistakes
of the Soviet ideologists”116. According to him, the Soviet ideologists forced people
to cast aside their national cultures, erased national differences, and put people in an
artificial society. Akaev put this as while joining to own culture; cultures of different
nationalities make people richer, patient and assured, and feel people could still feel
as a part of united people and citizen of state. Here it should be mentioned that
indeed, in the present national policy of Kyrgyzstan there is no oppression to develop
various ethnics’ language, culture, traditions, and religion. In fact, this is the only
distinctive factor that was not existent in the Soviet period.
Furthermore, at the anniversary, Akaev emphasized his belief that Kyrgyzstan people
strengthened their values, namely, civil peace, stability and interethnic consensus in
the state; have formed principles of nation-state and premises for building nation;
have worked to strengthen democratization in political, economic, and social process
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in the republic for last years with the assistance of the Assembly117. However, his
emphasis on civil peace is remarkable in the sense that it was not preserved for last
years as ethnic and civic clashes occurred in southern region of the state; and
demonstrations of people to protest non-democratic regime in the republic have
continued.118Consequently, it shows that speeches at the congresses and the
anniversary are different from the real life in the republic. The much more realistic
speech about languages and religions Akaev did at the end of his speech, claiming
that many ethnic groups now have opportunity to study secondary programs in own
languages such as Uzbek, Turk, Korean, Uigur, German, and Dungan119. Then,
remarking Central Asian region, including Kyrgyzstan as a mixture of various
cultures and religions, such as Buddhism, Shamanism, Christianity, Islam and so on,
President emphasized his willingness to revive the “Silk Road”, where different
cultures and religions had existed.
At the anniversary, chairman of the assembly, Begaliev detected that the Assembly
has been recognized as the successful organization by other former Soviet republics.
Begaliev indicated this as officials of the Ministry on Interethnic questions of the
Russian Federation several times visited KPA and showed interest in the assembly’s
works. Consequently, as a result of the visit, protocol of cooperation between KPA
and the Russian Federation People’s Assembly (RFPA) was signed in Moscow in
1998120.
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The third congress of the assembly was held in 2000 in Bishkek. In the congress,
President of the Republic re-pointed out that the Kyrgyz Republic has chosen the
right way of solving interethnic relations, with real mechanisms to lead interethnic
relations. The only thing that has made displeased Akaev was emigration of the
Russians and Slavs from Kyrgyzstan. Akaev mentioned that the Russians as well as
indigenous people - the Kyrgyzs - tie and unite all of people of Kyrgyzstan through
their language and culture121.
Accordingly, in 1999, President singed Decree on the Measures for Regulation of the
Migration Processes, which aimed to solve mature problems of the Russian- speaking
citizens. In addition, law on the status of Russian language in the Kyrgyz Republic as
an official language was declared122.
During his speech, Chairman Begaliev outlined that citizenship agreements between
Kyrgyzstan and Russia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan; and intergovernmental treaty
about the status of citizens temporarily living in Russia and the Russian-speaking
citizens in Kyrgyzstan were ratified. Additionally, it was outlined that in 1999, KPA
made the agreement of experience exchanges with the Russian Federation People’s
Assembly, and Department of Public Relations was opened at the Ministry of Internal
Affairs of KR.
After Begaliev, Chairman of the Russian Federation People’s Assembly (RFPA),
Ramazan Abdulatipov explained the works of RFPA since its establishment in July
1998. Abdulatipov noted that RFPA works without active support of federal body
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powers but with understandable support of President V. Putin, and many leaders in
the Russian Federation123. He underlined that RFPA is one of the elaborators of the
conception of the Russian Federation’s national policy. Chairman of RFPA asserted
that warm relations between Kyrgyzstan and the Russian Federation are going on
despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union. At the end, he bestowed the gold
medal Edinstvo Rossii on Akaev for his contribution to the Friendship of People and
Unity of Russia124.
Proclaimed declaration of the third congress was called “XXI century –Century for
Flourishing, Friendship, and Consolidation of Kyrgyzstan People” (30 June 2000).
2. 6 Social Organization “Slavonic Foundation in Kyrgyzstan”
One of the considerable associations in the KPA is Slavic Foundation in Kyrgyzstan
(SFinK), which was established for supporting the Russians and Russian-speaking in
Kyrgyzstan in September 1990. Dhekshenkulov indicates that SFinK has taken a
leading place in Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly125, while Kosmarskaya claims
“Russian-speaking are very badly informed about the performance of the Slavic
Foundation or other local organizations”126.
The main office of the foundation is situated in House of Friendship. In addition,
despite the dense population of Slavs in the northern part of the Republic, Slavic
Foundation has opened its offices in five regions of Kyrgyzstan, which are:
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1) Issyk-Kul region;
2) Naryn region;
3) Osh region;
4) Talass region;
5) Chu region.
SFinK is also considered as an active association in different activities and spheres.
In Cultural Sphere:
Every year SFinK organizes and celebrates Slavic holidays such as Christmas,
Rojdestvo, Maslennitsa, Paskha and so on. Moreover, the foundation organizes
educational holiday “Slavonic cultures and writings”. In 1999, the holiday “Slavic
cultures and writings” was dedicated to 200 years of anniversary of the great poet
A.S. Pushkin127. Additionally, at the Kyrgyz-Slavic University there are organized
tests, Olympiads for students and pupils for developing and supporting Russian
language, literature, and culture.
Legal Sphere:
One of the primary aims of SFinK is to protect the rights of the Russians. The
Russians, who have problems related to their national status in the republic, may
address the SFinK, where lawyers of the foundation process complaints and
applications. Accordingly, in case of need, lawyers send applications to legislative
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bodies of the Republic128. As a result, forming Kyrgyz-Russian commission regarding
human right issue was suggested. However, Bogatyrev argues that Kyrgyzstan does
not have norms, mechanisms and procedures guaranteeing realization of human rights
inside the Republic, even though it has ratified related international conventions129.
President of the SFinK, V.Vishnevskii is the vice-chairman of KPA, and also member
of the Council of Compatriots under the Duma of the Russian Federation130. Through
the Council of Compatriots, the SFinK keeps contact with Ministries and Government
of the Russian Federation, in order to consider the problems of the Russian
compatriots in the Kyrgyz Republic131.
Furthermore, the Russians living in Kyrgyzstan are still supplied with various and
many Russian newspapers and magazines, TV and radio channels. For example, since
June 2002, Rossiyskaya gazeta is in promulgation in Bishkek, which is the largest
state edition of Russia. More than 1 million 800 thousand copies are printed in 31
counties, and latest news from Moscow is brought to the public132.
Employment sphere
One of the central problems of the national policy of the Kyrgyz Government is
policy of cadres. Concerning this issue, there are two contradictory arguments. First,
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those in the line of Kosmorskaya argue that there is inequity towards the Russians
living in Kyrgyzstan, in particular, forcing them to leave leading state positions (state
bodies, banks, tax offices, custom services, legislative structures, education and
health spheres)133.  The second is that the Russians who left their positions were eager
to emigrate since they did not see a future in their positions and careers134.
Consequently, these claims have different explanations. Many respondents of surveys
organized at the congresses of KPA responded to the question “which problem’s
solution would provide with stabilization and harmonization in political interethnic
relations?” as delegating equal number of specialists from ethnic groups at the state
bodies would provide stabilization and harmony in political interethnic relations135.
On one hand, surveys’ results showed that not only the Russians but also other
nationalities also want to have representatives at the state bodies as in a multinational
society. On the other hand, as mentioned before, Kyrgyz officials affirm that there are
representatives from different ethnics at the state and local bodies. Indeed, at present,
the prime minister of the Kyrgyz Republic is Russian of origin136.
Apart from SFinK, there was opened “Russian House in Kyrgyzstan” on February
2003. Its aim is to unite all Russians in Kyrgyzstan; propagandize Russian culture,
great and powerful language of Pushkin, Tolstoy, Bunin, and Esenin, and piously
respect and strength brotherly relations of Alatoo people137. Russian House unlike
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Slavonic Foundation is house for the Russians and for those who spiritually thinks
that he or she is the Russian138. Whereas, Slavonic Foundation is representation of all
the Russian-Speaking population in the Republic.
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CHPATER III
MAIN ISSUES OF THE RUSSIAN MINORITY IN KYRGYZSTAN
3.1 Status of Russian Language in the Kyrgyz Republic
During the Soviet times, only a half of the population mostly living in countryside of
the republic spoke Kyrgyz. Nelli Portnova argues that the reason of it was
“Russification” in cultural sphere, repression against national intelligentsia139.
Accepting that the language and culture of Sovietization were Russian, however,
Hosking believes that it was not “Russification”140. He argues that in practice local
languages had been used in primary schools and some publications were in local
languages. In fact, the Soviet Kyrgyzstan had a bilingual language policy, one of
them was Kyrgyz language used in communication and education; the second was
Russian used in education, documentation, and in official and international
representations. Both of these languages had been used in education, however, it
should be clarified that education in Kyrgyz, in national language was given
habitually in village schools, while education in Russian was given in city schools
and it was much more privileged rather than education in Kyrgyz. People graduated
from Kyrgyz schools were considered as backward people141. Moreover, pupils and
students who studied in Kyrgyz were obliged to study Russian, whereas Kyrgyz
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language was not studied at Russian educated spheres. Indeed, knowledge of Russian
had been the key to social advancement, and also education in Russian had much
priority in development planning. Nonetheless, the privilege of Russian did not
influence publication of magazines and books in Kyrgyz, which were, however,
published in few copies.
Reforms in language policy have been started in the Republic at the end of the 1980s.
Consequently, in 1989, the official language of the republic was declared Kyrgyz
language. There was insignificant reaction of the non-Kyrgyz nationalities; Kyrgyz
history, literature, and languages have become obligatory subjects in both Russian
and Kyrgyz schools.
However, there have been considerable difficulties in adapting national language in
documentation, and administrative works, which led to the correction of the Kyrgyz
Government in the state language policy, permitting to use Russian for documenting
in dense lived places of the Russian speaking population.
In June 1994, the Decree of President Akaev declared Russian as an official language
in the territories, areas, and collectives such as education and health services, where
the Russian-speaking people are dominant in population142. On May 29, 2000
Russian was proclaimed as an official language. Furthermore, the Kyrgyz
Government postponed compulsory learning of the Kyrgyz language143. Many policy-
makers of the Republic state that Russian was proclaimed as a language of
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communication. For instance, the chairman of Council of National Security, Kalik
Imankulov asserts “Russian proclaimed as official language not because of living of
many Russian-speakers but because of communication of all nationalities in this
language”144. Dhekshenkulov also notices that Russian not only an official language
in the republic but also language of international communication145. In addition,
decree about Russian as an official language in Kyrgyzstan was officially marked in
the Russian Parliament, Duma (June 28 2000)146.
After taking Russian as official language, all decrees and laws of President of KP,
legal documents have started to be published in Russian and Kyrgyz (state and
official languages). All meetings of the Kyrgyz Parliament, Jogorku Kenesh and
Legislative assembly and the Government are held in both languages. Russian
became a must course for all schools and universities as during the Soviet times147.
Moreover, in the beginning of independence and proclaiming Kyrgyz as a state
language had led to migration of the Russians, Germans, Jews, Ukrainians, Tatars,
and other nationalities. After the adaptation of a law making Russian an official
language of the republic gave more or less certainty to live in Kyrgyzstan for the rest
non-Kyrgyz nationalities. Nick Megoran contends that the adaptation of law affirmed
President Akaev’s slogan: “Kyrgyzstan is our common home”148.
Concerning the weakness of the state language policy, Kosmarskaya states that there
are still difficulties in using Kyrgyz language as the official language as it is not easy
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to conduct meetings of the parliament and government in state language; teaching
nuclear physics or comparative anatomy in Kyrgyz language. According to
Kosmarskaya, Kyrgyzstan was not immediately ready to use state language in all
spheres since there was the need to translate Russian into Kyrgyz in finance and
institutional levels. In other words, not only publication of new books, training aids
were needed in finance but also there was the need for linguists and teachers who
could teach Kyrgyz language. Consequently, for Kosmarskaya, Russian is still the
widely used language by the population149. On the other hand, there are claims that
there were not attempts to develop national language despite the difficulties, as they
are natural in the beginning of transition. For example, Aali Moldokanov explains
how transformed state funding for regulating an official language was spent not
according to fixing and not effective, that is, for worse. He claims that funding was
spent for teaching Kyrgyz in organizations that was without result; for setting
expensive apparatuses for simultaneous translations at meeting halls, expecting to
organize all meetings in the state language; and the rest of funding was stolen150.
Apart from this, there is discrepancy at the rural and urban level:  The Kyrgyzs who
live in cities, in particular, Bishkek do not speak Kyrgyz very well, or do not speak
Kyrgyz language at all, whereas in countryside, people speak mostly Kyrgyz151.
Therefore, it seems that there are difficulties in transition from Russian into Kyrgyz,
in particular, for city population where density of Russian-speaking is higher and for
                                                                                                                                          
148 RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol.4, No 108, Part 1, 5 June 2000, p. 1
149 Between Southern and Northern population of Kyrgyzstan there is difference in speaking
languages, Russian is mostly spoken in the North and in the cities of the republic, while Southern
population speaks Kyrgyz with Uzbek accent.
150 Cited from Portnova, p.93.
57
all state bodies, universities, institutions that are used to conduct their work in
Russian. Nevertheless, transition process should be considered as a long-term
process, and that it could not be concluded for five-ten years. Furthermore, people
have to have desire to use and speak their native language apart from time and
finance required for this process.
Salimjan Zhigitov, in “Yazikovoy Problemy u Nas Net, a Est’ ee Neponimanie”,
claims that Russian language fulfils the function of the official language152. The proof
is that all documentation (laws, resolutions) are carried out and written in Russian and
then they are translated in Kyrgyz. What is interesting to note is that even translations
of those documents and publications are not good. Zhigitov claims that every great
nation, more or less, is interested in spreading its language, and through this the
nation spreads its influence. In this case, Russia is not an exception. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia did not continue its efforts to keep Russian as an
international language despite its presence in the former republics as a second
language153. On the contrary, the Kyrgyz Government have proclaimed Russian as an
official language and endeavored to keep Russian as an international language in the
Republic. Indeed, Russian language is still powerful in Kyrgyzstan. Although,
nobody knows how much this situation will continue since English is quickly
spreading in the world154. However, the former ambassador of the Russian Federation
in the Kyrgyz Republic, Rudov puts forward that language of the country where
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somebody lives is essential to know155. By these words, he means that for
nationalities living in Kyrgyzstan to learn and speak Kyrgyz is a necessity.
Looking at language issue from another point, Kyrgyz is a rich and ancient language;
during the Soviet period it had been taken at the second place and Russian was
dominant. Only attaining independence has given an opportunity to facilitate the
adaptation of law making Kyrgyz as the state language. However, today Kyrgyz
despite being the state language is still behind Russian. Giving Russian the status of
an official language has weakened strengthening and using Kyrgyz. Several years
ago, Nick Megoran analyzed giving Russian the status of “an official language” in
two reasons: garnering support from the Russian-speaking population in the run-up to
the presidential vote in the fall 2000, and winning Moscow’s support for Bishkek156.
Megoran also emphasized that it could be that President Akaev’s intention was to win
support from urban Kyrgyz communities and the non-Kyrgyz population as well as to
present himself as a liberal, intelligent leader who alone blocks the nationalist
hordes157.
The outcome of law on Russian language was twofold: It has really won plaudits
from the Russian speaking population, and at the same time it has given rise to a
strong reaction from Kyrgyz nationalists who concern about the fate of their
language. In this manner, Bishkek is still perceived as a pro-Russian republic.   
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3.2 Status of Dual Citizenship
The idea of “dual citizenship” was quite pretty for the Russians; however, it was not
agreed and progressed in the reality. On January 8, 1997, an agreement between the
Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz Republic about a simplified order of receiving
citizenship for citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, who would live temporarily in the
Russian Federation, and citizens of the Russian Federation coming to live for
temporarily time into the Kyrgyz Republic”, was accepted158.
Until today, although President Akaev favors it, the Kyrgyz Parliament did not
approve dual citizenship. Turkmenistan granted dual citizenship to its Russian
population in December 1993, and Tajikistan followed in September 1995, and the
latest country that approved dual citizenship is Kazakhstan. Only Uzbekistan has
declared itself opposed to the very principle of dual citizenship.
3.3 Migration of the Russians from Kyrgyz Republic to the Russian Federation
Problem of migration has been on the agenda since the beginning of 1990s.
Generally, increase in the social-economic problems, national feeling and interethnic
tensions have motivated migration159.
After attaining its independence, Kyrgyzstan held the first national population census
in 1999. According to the results of that census, there were 4,822,938 people, which
shows an increase of 13,3% compared to the population census in 1989. The 1999
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census showed that quantity of the Asian nationalities such as the Kyrgyzs, the
Uzbeks, the Dungans, the Uygurs, the Turks, the Tadjiks grew up from 52,4% to
64,9% in the last ten years; whereas number of European nationalities such as the
Russians, the Ukrainians, the Germans, the Greeks, the Jews decreased to a great
extend. In 1989, the number of the Russians comprised of 21,5% of population,
whereas in 1999 they comprised of only 12,5%160.
Jivogladov considers questions dealing with migration of the nationalities from
Kyrgyzstan to the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Germany, Israel, Uzbekistan, and the
United States and argues that within 1992, more than 102,000 people left Kyrgyzstan
as almost the same number of people (106,000) who left Tajikistan during the civil
war161. According to Jivoglyadov, there were two main reasons for this migration: 1)
Current economic difficulties; 2) Threat of political explosions and interethnic
conflicts. Jivoglyadov also states that according to the report of UN on human
development problems in the first half of 1993, Kyrgyzstan was on 83rd place, while
Russia was on 37th place. It means that people migrate to Russia in order to see
guarantees for their future, to get jobs, wages, and to live in a politically and
economically stable state. The outcome of this migration was “brain drain” (utechka
mozgov). Since Jivoglyadov sees economic deterioration as the main reason of
migration, he points out that as ‘brain drain” gets higher, economy in the state
worsens. Consequently, as a solution to revert the migration process, Jivoglyadov
suggests keeping and inviting specialists to develop economy and advance level of
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life in the Republic, also proposes to omit column “nationality” and leave column
“citizenship” in new passports of the Kyrgyz Republic and in other documents.
Valeriy Uleev, President of the Association “Slavic diaspora” (Slavyanskaya
diaspora) in the Jalal-Abad region, is pessimistic about the future of the Russians in
Kyrgyzstan.  Uleev claims that the Russians have gradually lost their jobs, and
perceived that they will be only on second or third positions; which meant they did
not have career prospects. Additionally, Uleev points out that many parents complain
about the sharp decrease of the level of education at schools because of leaving
Russian teachers162. Consequently, Uleev proposes social organizations to
recommend own candidates to public deputy, in order to overcome such problems.
However, according to V. Saenko, member of the Ukrainian society “Bereginya”,
there existed two main problems in the nationality question: first, a state language,
and second, dual citizenship. He believes that solution for these problems would
diminish migration of the Russian speakers.
Nonetheless, the fact that migration of the Russians and Russian speaking population
still continue, even if the number of migrants have changed from time to time.
Between 1990 and 1991, 33,600 Russian-speaking people migrated from Kyrgyzstan,
while in 1992, the number of the Russian migrants reached 65,400. In 1993,
migration reached its peak and the number of migrants reached a figure more than
120,000, including 81,000 of the Russians. In 1994, there was a slow down in the
migration process, which it decreased as much as to the figure of 49,400. In the
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following years, 1995, 1996, 1997, the migration comprised 20,100; 15,000; and
11,400 respectively163. According to the official data, in 1998, 879,900 Russian-
speaking people remained in Kyrgyzstan, including only 690,900 as the Russian
origin people.
In the 1996 survey, Kosmarskaya concludes that 42,4% of the Russians voted for not
to leave; whereas 47,4% said they want to leave but have hesitations (in this case,
reasons were declared as difficulties in leaving and settling; and new difficulties
waiting in Russia); 5,3% said they already decided to leave and took necessary
measures; and 4,9% said they were leaving to abroad but not to Russia. Whereas, in
the survey of 1998, the ratio of Russian who said they do not want to leave was
57,6%; whereas 32,4% said they would like to leave; 2,6% said they had plans to
leave; and 7,5% said they were leaving to abroad but not to Russia164. Comparing the
results of 1998 with 1996 survey, the decline in leaving Kyrgyzstan can be seen.
It should be outlined that according to statistics and answers of respondents for the
surveys, there are migrants who returned back to Kyrgyzstan. Main reasons for
returning back were difficulties in settling and socio-psychological adaptation in
Russia165.  In accordance with 1996 survey, 87% of respondents “heard” about
coming back of migrants to Kyrgyzstan, while 58% of respondents personally knew
them166. The 1998 survey showed that another reason of returning back was social
and psychological barrier between “locals” and “outsiders”.
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Kosmorskaya says that the reasons of migration to the RF were having children and
relatives in Russia, feeling comfortable in the motherland, and the availability of
opportunities in education, work, career in Russia 167:
Moreover, Kosmorskaya determinates the reasons of the Russians who do not want to
leave Kyrgyzstan as having relatives and friends in the KR, considering KR as the
motherland, and the feeling as “outsider” and fear of being isolated when they go
back to Russia.
Concerning migration, Zhigitov contends that before the collapse of the Soviet Union
about 45,000 the Kyrgyzs had lived in Russia, whereas today more than 400.000 the
Kyrgyzs live in Russia. According to Zhigitov, the reason of migration of the
Russians is for economic reasons since majority of the Russians have also left Russia
in the last couple of years. Stating that the reason of migration is economic, Valentin
Bogatyrev also argues that even language policy has not helped to stop migration to
the RF168. That is why for Bogatyrev, migration to Russia is not only composed of the
Russians but also of the Kyrgyzs. Bogatyrev says that between 400,000 and 700,000
of the Kyrgyzs live in the Russian territories, in particular Ural and Siberia, which
were the ‘homelands’ of the Kyrgyzs169. Additionally to this claim, Smirnov, from
the newspaper Independent Newspaper, states that the reason of migration the
Russians is economic rather than ethnic as for ten years, about 450,000 the Kyrgyzs
left Kyrgyzstan and went to Russia 170. Thus, it follows that the reason of migration of
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the nationalities, including Russians depends on economic factors rather than ethnic
differences nor the national policy.
Omarov, who carried out a research on the migration processes from Kyrgyzstan
between the years of 1991 and 2000, gives the number of the Russian migrants as
300,037 that makes 56%171. Omarov in his research divides migration processes into
two periods: the first one, from 1991 to the first half of 1994 years; and the second,
from the second half of 1994 to the end of 2000. During the first period, the migration
was because of weak policy of the Kyrgyz Government towards migrants that led to
large growth in the migration processes. Whereas, during the second period the
stabilization of migration in the Republic started as a result of some measures taken,
such as elaboration of priority directions of migration policy and formation of
agencies.
However, as indicated by the researches, in 1998, migration processes decreased to
5,500 migrants, and during the second half of 1999, migration started to increase
again. In 1999, migration to Russia consisted of 6,123 people; while in 2000 it
increased three times, reaching a figure of 18,435 people, which is indeed a great
number of people.
As an outcome of all this migration process, half of million of the Kyrgyzs
permanently migrated to Russia for earning money, in particular, to Ural and Siberia.
Therefore, to protect the right of those Kyrgyz and Russian emigrants, Department of
Migration Services by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and
Representation of the Federal Migration Services by the Embassy of the Russian
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Federation in Kyrgyzstan follow all migration processes and settlement of Kyrgyz
citizens into the Russian Federation.
According to survey, generally, the reasons of migration of the Russians were172:
1) Caring about the future of children - 59%;
2)  Instability in economy – 58%;
3) Low wages – 41%;
4) Unemployment – 39%;
5) Dissatisfaction in legislature – 38%;
6) Discrimination at works – 12%;
7) Discrimination in normal life – 10%;
8) Environment - 9%.
As a matter of fact, the Kyrgyz Government provides the Russians with several
measures, including the liberalization of their language in order to avoid the large-
scale emigration and the ‘brain drain’.
Indeed, through this period, people who had opportunity to leave Kyrgyzstan already
left and there remained only those who were not able to leave. In other words, the
mass migration has already acclimatized. Ostanchuk says that in order to preserve
interethnic accord in Kyrgyzstan, one of the best legal bases in the former Soviet
Union Republics was created. Ostanchuk outlines that there are many problems for
emigrants in Russia too that migrants should not anticipate Russia as a “paradise”
country, and they must leave Kyrgyzstan in the last resort173. Moreover, the former
ambassador of the Russian Federation in the Kyrgyz Republic, G.A. Rudov also
                                                                                                                                          
171 N.M. Omarov, Migratsionnye protsessy v Kyrgyzskoy Respublike v gody Nezavisimosti I itogi
Desyatiletiya, Bishkek, 2001, p 73
172 Tugunbaev T., “…I chemodannoe nastroenie pust’ pokinet vas”, Slovo Kyrgyzstana, May 18 2001,
p.3
173 Ostapchuk, V., “Gde on , Bereg Nadejd?”, Interview with the chairman of the Representative of
Migratory Services of the Russian Federation at the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyrgyzstan,
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, June 29 2001, p.6
66
notices that Russia is ready to accept all compatriots, however, does not promise
them “paradise” life174.
Most of the researches, and surveys show that a high ration of migration caused an
economic crisis in the Republic. Consequently, there are some attempts to decrease
migration in the Republic. For instance, the Ministry of Social Defense and Labor
opened the Migration Department Kyrgyzvneshtrud (Kyrgyz External Labor).
Moreover, the Kyrgyz Government has made Intergovernmental Agreements relating
to workers with not only NIS but also with Near East, Malaysia, Korea. For instance,
during an official visit in Moscow, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in Kyrgyzstan
Lydia Imanalieva met with officials of Russian Federation and discussed “the
question of creating of law, social and economic conditions of working activity for
Kyrgyz people in Russia and for the Russians in Kyrgyzstan”175.
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CONCLUSION
From an analysis of the Soviet Nationality Policy, it can be seen that ex-Soviet
Kyrgyzstan had appeared at the end of the XX century as a multinational state. The
present thesis analyzed in what level the Soviet Nationality policy developed a
mixture of Kyrgyz nationality with the Russians, and the Russian speaking
population; and cultivated Russian as an international language for realizing
‘Sovietization’. Nevertheless, the first part of the research indicated that the
nationality question was never “solved” during the Soviet times. It can be observed
that the Soviet leaders were convinced that under communism, distinct nationalities
would ultimately fade away. As Gregory Gleason also asserts “the Soviet Union had
attempted to go beyond nationalism to communism, with the collapse of communism,
nationalism was back again”176. That is, beliefs of the Soviet leaders failed since the
national problems in the Union had still been “there”. Moreover, this thesis shows
that Lenin’s National policy aimed to build ‘proletarian internationalism’ had
remained in theory. Being loyal to Lenin’s National policy, the Soviet leaders had
used different policies such as “Russification”, “Indigenization’, “Industrialization”,
so as to attain “Sovietization”, generate the “Soviet People”, and avoid the national
problems. In the historical part, we see that Stalin supposed that through
“Indigenization” the Union would achieve “Sovietization”. Moreover, he was in favor
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of ultra-centralized, Russo centric, and bureaucratic party-state177.   Khrushchev’s
national policy is examined as a limited cultural renaissance among the nationalities
after Stalin’s severe policy but still he had gone behind Stalin’s policy. This thesis
additionally shows that no considerable changes in the Soviet Nationality policy
existed during Brezhnev’s era. However, Andropov is considered as the first
reformist in the Soviet Nationality policy, despite his short leadership in the Union
and his loyalty to communist ideals. Furthermore, this research reveals that under
Gorbachev’s rule, the Soviet Nationality Policy appeared as “unsolved” policy. His
political and economic reforms led to the revival of national problems, and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union.
In Kyrgyzstan, the attainment of independence has brought different problems,
including national problems. Non-Kyrgyz nationalities started to suspect being
humiliated by the titular nationality, and migrate out of the Republic. This study of
the national policy of the Kyrgyz republic after 1991, however, shows that the
Kyrgyz National Policy did not formulate a totally new national policy towards non-
Kyrgyz nationalities. It has followed the Soviet nationality policy, in particular, the
policy of “Internationalism” with some differences such as declaration of certain
national attributes after 1991, and Kyrgyz as the state language in 1989. Apart from
these, as it indicated in the second chapter, there are differences between Soviet and
Kyrgyz national policy as well. Such a difference is a full right for developing the
nationalities values such as, history, language, culture, and traditions is attributed to
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different nationality people living in the Kyrgyz territory. Furthermore, the elaborated
study of Kyrgyz National policy illustrates that there is a considerable similarity with
Soviet Nationality policy in theorization and implementation of “internationalism”, in
particular, using the slogan “Kyrgyzstan is our Common Home” and establishing
Kyrgyzstan People’s Assembly (KPA). Another reason to claim that the Kyrgyz
National Policy is pro-Soviet policy or follower of “internationalization” policy is the
declaration of Russian as an official and international language.
In addition, this thesis is an attempt to demonstrate that despite the declaration of
Kyrgyz as the state language, Kyrgyz is not as commonly used and needed as
Russian, and has only a formal status in the Republic.
This research, in addition, marks that migration of the Russians and the Russian-
speaking from Kyrgyzstan is still the main issue in the national policy and taken into
consideration by both governments. Furthermore, this research as well as many
researches on the migration of the Russians from Kyrgyzstan explains that the most
significant reason of migration is economic rather than ethnic.   
As a result of the study, it may be outlined that the National Policy of the Kyrgyz
Republic towards the Russian Minority after 1991 is rationally positive but still has
problems in economic, political, and social spheres such as unemployment,
migration, and dual citizenship. Nonetheless, it should be delineated that all
nationalities in the Republic have these problems and share these problems with the
Russians. Still, declaration of Russian as an official language; foundation of Social
Organizations and Slavonic-Kyrgyz University that provides both Kyrgyz and
Russian diploma; and arrangement for developing the Russians’ history, culture,
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language, and traditions are reasons to state that the National Policy of the Kyrgyz
Republic towards the Russian Minority is practically positive.
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: The Survey of the First Congress 
 December 21, 1994 
The purpose of the survey was to reveal opinions of different ethnic groups over actual 
problems in the Republic. Also, it aimed to work out suggestions and recommendations for 
stabilizing and coming to interethnic accord.   
451 participants of the first congress took part in the survey conducted by local researches 
Omuraliev, Elebaeva, Buhnyak, and Karybaeva.  
 
1. The 
Kyrgyzs 
26.8% 11.The Turks 2.4% 
2.Russians 
 
16,0% 12.The Kurds 2.4% 
3.Ukranians 
 
3.3% 13.The Bashkirs 0.4% 
4.The Uygurs 
 
4.2% 14.The Chechens 0.4% 
5.The 
Dungans 
2.4% 15.The Kalmyks 0.2% 
6. The Jews 
 
3.3% 16.The Avars 0.7% 
7.The 
Germans 
4.0% 
 
17.The Lezgins 0.4% 
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8.The Tadjiks 1.6% 18.The 
Armenians 
0.4% 
9.The 
Azerbaijanis 
1.6% 
 
19.The Gypsies 
 
0.2% 
 
10.The 
Belorussians 
1.6%  20.Other 
nationalities 
7.5% 
List of ratios of participants in Omuraliev, Elebaeva, Buhnyak, and Karybaeva survey 
 
Among 451 respondents there were 64,5% - male; 32,4% - female; 20,0% - 18-29 years 
old; 37,5% - 30-45 years old; 29,3% - 46-60 years old; and 9,3% - more than 60 years old.  
Questions in the first part of the survey were as follows: 
1) How do you estimate a political situation in the republic? 
Alternatives:  
a) Stable situation, fully controlled; 
b) Stable situation, however, it may be out of control; 
c) Unstable situation and it is going out of control; 
d) Unstable situation and it characterizes critical struggle of political powers; 
e) Your alternative 
Percentages of the answer were: 
a) 14,6% 
b) 60,3% 
c) 12,9% 
d) 7,3% 
e) – 
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Practically, 61,1% of the Russians responded that situation in the republic is stable, but it 
may be out of control, whereas the Kyrgyzs comprised of 52,9%. 
 
2) According to you, who determines political life in the republic and how much? 
 Totally 
% 
Mostly 
% 
Partly 
% 
In no 
way 
% 
Difficult 
to ans. % 
The President 22,4 45,5 16,6 1,1 2,0 
Jogorku Kenesh 6,0 26,2 25,1 2,2 4,7 
Cabinet of Ministers 3,3 10,2 25,1 4,2 6,0 
Party of Communists 1,3 3,1 16,4 9,1 10,4 
Democratic Party 
Erkin Kyrgyzstan 
0,4 2,0 14,2 8,6 12,4 
Party of Democratic 
Movement in 
Kyrgyzstan 
0,4 2,7 14,2 7,8 13,7 
Party Asaba 0,0 3,5 15,3 8,2 12,4 
Party Ata-Meken 0,0 1,1 8,0 9,8 16,9 
Republic Public Party 
in Kyrgyzstan 
0,0 0,2 6,0 9,3 18,2 
Social Democrats 1,1 0,4 8,6 10,6 15,7 
Party of Agrarians 0,0 0,9 7,1 11,8 14,2 
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According to results, the President mostly influences political life in the Republic. 
Moreover, amid the parties, the party Asaba was the most supported party, as 33,3 % of the 
Russians voted for it.  
 
3) If situation was unstable then which political power’s counter struggle would be?  
Alternatives: 
a) Between the President and Jogorku Kenesh; 
b) Between the President and different executive structures such as Ministries, 
regional executive powers Akimiyat; 
c) Between the President and political parties; 
d) Between executive powers and legislative powers; 
e) Between rightist and leftist parties; 
f) Your alternative. 
Respondents’ answer was in the following way: the most counter struggle would be 
between the president and different executive structures. However, the rest of the 
alternatives scored approximately the same percentages. Nevertheless, it should be outlined 
that analysis showed that different ethnic groups differently perceive counter struggle 
between political powers. For example, while the Kyrgyzs consider that counter struggle 
might be between the president and political parties, the Russians assume that counter 
struggle might be between the president and Jogorku Kenesh. 
 
The first question of the second part focused on the perspective of democratic reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan. 
Question 1): How do you think, how much is Kyrgyzstan democratic today? 
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Alternatives: 
a) Democracy in plenty; 
b) Enough democratic; 
c) A little bit democratic; 
d) There is no democracy; 
e) Your alternative. 
Answers: 
a) 26,6% 
b) 19,1% 
c) 19,5% 
d) 22,8% 
e) – 
Indeed, it was interesting to see that the most pointed out alternative “democracy in the 
republic in plenty”.  However, in this case 33,9% of the Kyrgyzs, 63,2 of the Koreans, 
66,7% of the Avars, 75,0% of the Balkars considered that “democracy in the republic in 
plenty”, whereas 36,1% of the Russians, 33,3% of the Ukrainians, 50,0% of Uzbeks 
believed that “there is no democracy” in the republic.  
Question:  2) What level of democratic development in Kyrgyzstan will be in the future?  
Alternatives: 
a) Democracy will be extended and strengthen in all spheres; 
b) The present level of democratic development will be preserved; 
c) It will be decreased; 
d) Your alternative. 
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According to the answers, more than half of the respondents (52,1%) thought that 
democratic development would extend and strengthen; whereas 8,2% of respondents were 
convinced that the level of democracy in the state would decrease. 
 
Question 3) According to your opinion, what system can likely promote the democratic 
development in the Republic? 
Alternatives: 
a) System without parties; 
b) One-party system; 
c) Multi-party system; 
d) Difficult to answer; 
e) Your alternative. 
In this case, more than half of respondents (56,5%) answered that multi-party system can 
promote democratic development in the republic.  
Question 4) If one-party system is not then which party you would prefer? 
The most preferable party was party of communists in Kyrgyzstan; of course, those 
respondents who were for one-party system preferred this party. Majority of supporters one 
party system among the nationalities were the Balkars (25,0%), the Tatars (19,0%), the 
Russians (15,3%), and the Kyrgyzs (14,9%). 
 
Third part of the survey concentrated on evaluation of the present interethnic situation in 
the republic. Questions of this section were as follows: 
1) Will strained political struggles reflect interethnic position in the Republic? 
Alternatives: 
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a) Will not reflect; 
b) Possible but in an insignificant measure; 
c) Will lead to polarization of the nationalities; 
d) Will provoke into interethnic resistance; 
e) Will lead to interethnic conflicts; 
f) Your alternative. 
Majority of respondents considered that political struggles might reflect interethnic position 
in the state but to a insignificant level. In particular, the Russians (80,6%) thought that 
political struggles might lead to polarization of the nationalities (47,2%), interethnic 
resistance (18,1%), and interethnic conflicts (15,3%); the Ukrainians (93,3%) accordingly 
33,3%, 43,3%, and 16,7%, the Germans (77,7%), 33,3%, 33,3%, and 11,1%, and the Jews 
(66,7%), 40,0%, 20,0%, and 6,7%. 
2) How do you characterize the present interethnic relations? 
Alternatives: 
a) Quiet, friendly; 
b) Mostly quiet but insignificantly confronted; 
c) Uneven, hostile; 
d) Hostile-conflicting; 
e) Confronted; 
f) Your alternative. 
Results showed that majority thinks that the present interethnic relations are quiet but 
insignificantly confronted. Mainly, the Russians (47,2%), the Koreans (36,9%), and the 
Belorussians (28,6%) characterized this question as uneven and confronted.  
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The forth part of the survey focused on determination of main problems and factors to 
stabilize interethnic relations (in political, socio-economic, culture-lingual, legal, 
administrative spheres). 
First question of this section: According to you, which problem’s solution will provide with 
stabilization and harmonization of interethnic relations in the republic? 
Alternatives and results: 
1) In political sphere  
a) Delegating equal number of specialists from ethnic groups at the state structures – 
46,1%; 
b) Strengthening bilateral economic and political relations between Kyrgyzstan and 
another states – 36,6%; 
c) Increasing responsibility of political parties and social organizations for the 
nationalities problems – 27,7%; 
d) Providing with double citizenship – 23,9%; 
e) Delegating the state to organizations, unions such as CIS – 6,9%. 
As it is seen from the percentages, people mostly considered that delegating equal number 
of specialists from ethnic groups at state structures and political sphere would help to 
stabilize and harmonize interethnic relations in the state. 
Among all nationalities, the Russians (55,6%), the Ukrainians (60,0%), the Uzbeks 
(60.0%), the Uygyrs (68,4%), the Belorussians (85,7%), the Turks (81,8%), and the Tatars 
(71,4%) have thought that “policy of cadres” (kadrovaya politika) is significant. Besides 
“policy of cadres”, “double citizenship” issue was pointed out by the Russians (50,0%), the 
Ukrainians (33,3%), the Belorussians (57,1%), and the Germans (60,7%). 
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2) In Socio-Economic sphere: 
a) Increasing social security – 39,0%; 
b) Providing youth people with jobs – 32,4%; 
c) Solutions for increasing prices and decreasing level of life – 29,3%; 
d) Introducing the national currency in CIS – 21,1%; 
e) Ceasing mass migration – 20,2%.     
3) In Cultural-Lingual sphere: 
a) Status of Russian as an international language – 51,4%; 
b) Absence of press, art literature, and teaching aids in mother tongues – 21,3%; 
c) Absence of possibility to get education in mother tongues (at universities, schools) 
– 10,4%; 
d) Sharp transition to state Kyrgyz language – 10,4%; 
e) Absence of theaters, art groups of different nationalities and etc. – 5,2%. 
According to results, status of Russian was the most important factor in cultural-lingual 
sphere for stabilizing and harmonizing interethnic relations. To put clear, the status of 
Russian was significant for nationalities such as the Ukrainians (93,3%), the Tatars 
(90,0%), the Russians (86,1%), and the Germans (72,2%).  
4) In Legal sphere: 
a) Advance criminal and administrative responsibility for developing nationalism and 
giving offence on national dignity – 74,0%;  
b) Absence of legal guaranties and mechanisms to protect minority rights - 28,4%; 
c) Provide all nationalities with equal education – 27,7%; 
d) Absence of legal guarantees to promote careers for non-Kyrgyz nationalities 17,3%. 
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5) In administrative sphere: 
a) Establishment of persistent organization (like KPA) coordinating all social 
associations and having co-relations with government –36,4%; 
b) Formation of a separate department dealing with the nationalities question – 19,3%; 
c) National-cultural centers based on self-administration and self-finance – 18,6%; 
d) National-cultural centers as socio-state organizations –13,5%; 
e) Solutions for supporting national holidays by state structures – 12,0%. 
 
Next question was: Will formation of national ideology progress interethnic relations in the 
republic?  
a) No, will not – 6.9%; 
b) Yes, only partly – 32,8%; 
c) Yes, in an insignificant level – 40,8%; 
d) Difficult to answer – 14.9%; 
e) Your alternative. 
The most respondents outlined that the formation of national ideology will significantly 
improve interethnic relations. Although the Russians (54,2%), and the Belorussians 
(71,4%) supported answer (c).  
Moreover, the same question was asked in following way: How much the idea of the 
formation of united people in Kyrgyzstan will develop international relations, economy, 
political situation, rallying social groups, and other spheres.  
Answers were: 
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 Positively 
% 
Negative 
ly 
% 
In no 
way 
% 
International Relations 9,1 0,0 7,1 
Economy 52,5 2,7 7,3 
    Political situation     43,0     5,8    6,9 
Rallying social groups 41,5 3,8 7,1 
Other spheres 2,4 0,9 1,8 
  
Next part of the survey focused on the development of traditions, cultures, customs, and 
language of different nationalities. Questions of this section were: 
1) Do you have possibility to learn history, culture, language, customs, and traditions of 
your nationality? 
a) No, I do not have – The Koreans (63,2%), The Turks (72,7%), The Azerbaijanis 
(50,0%), The Kurds (54,5%); 
b)  In significant level – 40,4%; 
c) Yes, I have possibility – The Kyrgyzs 59,5%, The Russians (50,2%), 
 The Uzbeks (60,5 %); 
d) Difficult to answer; 
e) Your alternative. 
To the question “Do you have willing to learn traditions and customs more deeply?” 88,9% 
of respondents answered “yes”. To the question, “Who should take responsibility for 
developing traditions and cultures?” 53,8% of respondents indicated national-cultural 
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centers, 45,2% pointed out institutions of education, and only small number of respondents 
considered that families should take responsibility for developing traditions and customs.  
Next question related to traditions and customs was: Do you hold on your nationality’s 
traditions and customs? 
a) Always –20,4%; 
b) As much as possible – 56,5%; 
c) Dependent on condition – 19,3%; 
d) No, I do not hold on – 2,2%; 
e)  Your alternative. 
Question: Where do you often use your traditions and customs of your nationality? 
a) At work;  
b) In family celebrations (wedding, burial ceremonies, anniversaries) – 76,5%; 
c) In normal life –13,1%; 
d) Anywhere; 
e) Your alternative. 
As it is seen the nationalities’ traditions and customs are much more celebrated in family 
celebrations rather than at works, and normal life. Apart from above given questions there 
were several questions related to traditions and customs.  
Next question was focused on languages, which showed that Russian was more useful 
rather than Kyrgyz, although it was an official language in the Republic. The results 
showed that 68,5% of people speak in Russian at work; 65,2% during public 
transformation, 61,9% in shopping places; 55.2% at theater and clubs; 60.1% at state 
bodies. According to the results of the survey, people use their native language mostly in 
their family circles.  
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Question: What language do you mostly speak in the following cases? 
 In Native 
language % 
In Kyrgyz 
% 
In Russian 
% 
Working places/ 
institutions 
2,0 18,6 68,5 
In Families 26,4 24,4 38,4 
Public transportation 2,0 14,2 65,2 
Shopping places 1,3 16,4 61,9 
Theaters / clubs 1,3 14,2 55,2 
State bodies 1,8 12,2 60,1 
National-cultural centers 28,2 14,6 28,4 
 
Next question was related to migration:  
According to your opinion, what are real reasons of migration abroad? 
Alternatives and results: 
a) Increasing prices and low wages compared with another states – 60,8%; 
b) Unfavorable condition in the interethnic sphere – 36,4%; 
c) Unstable political situation in the republic –20,0%; 
d) Conditions of life and social life are not good – 7,8%; 
e) Forcing of domestic circumstances – 4,9%. 
As this survey showed, there were three main reasons of migration: 
1) Increasing prices and low wages compared to other states; 
2) Unfavorable conditions in the interethnic sphere; 
3) Unstable political situation in the Republic.  
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The final part of survey was about the perspectives for development of Kyrgyzstan as a 
multinational state. 
Question: Under what conditions may Kyrgyzstan achieve development? 
Alternatives and percentages of answers: 
a) Remaining multinational – 85,1%; 
b) Becoming mono-national – 6,4%; 
c) Difficult to answer – 4%; 
d) Your alternative. 
It should be outlined that 7,4% of the Kyrgyzs, 20.0% of the Jews, 14,3% of the Tajiks, 
9,1% of the Dungans, 5,9% of the Kazakhs, 5,3% of the Koreans, 5,3% of the Uygurs 
pointed out that remaining multinational state Kyrgyzstan may achieve development. 
Question: According to you, who might be warrant for solving actual problems in 
interethnic relations in the republic? 
a) The President - 67,4%; 
b) Jogorku Kenesh – 22,4%; 
c) Political parties – 12%; 
d) Constitutional court – 7,5%; 
e) Cabinet of Ministers – 6,9%. 
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APPENDIX B:  The Survey of the Second Congress  
February 17, 1996 
  
As in the first congress in the second congress there was done survey. It is aimed to 
research political, religious, and interethnic problems in the republic. 389 respondents 
participated in this survey.  
The first part of the survey was about political problems influencing the interethnic 
atmosphere. 
Question: Who, on the whole, determines political life in the republic and how much?  
 
 Complete
ly 
% 
Mostly 
% 
Partly 
% 
In no 
way 
% 
Difficult 
to 
answer 
% 
The 
President 
33,8 46,9 7,2 0,7 3,6 
Jogorku 
Kenesh 
3,6 14,8 40,3 5,6 5,9 
The 
Parliament 
4,3 16,4 31,1 7,5 8,2 
State 
Administrati
ons 
8,5 16,1 27,5 10,2 7,5 
Legal Power 2,3 4,6 22,3 20,7 11,1 
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Political 
Parties 
1,3 3,0 21,3 22,3 12,5 
 
Question: What political party’s activity is dominant in the republic and in the region? 
Parties Active in the 
republic  % 
Active in the 
region  % 
Not Active 
    % 
Agrarian party 1,3 5,9 17,7 
Democratic Party Erkin 
Kyrgyzstan 
11,1 10,5 12,8 
Party Asaba 11,5 4,3 14,4 
Party Ata Meken 3,6 8,5 13,4 
Party of democratic 
movement of Kyrgyzstan 
8,5 5,9 16,4 
Party of unity of 
Kyrgyzstan 
3,9 4,9 18,0 
Party of Communists of 
Kyrgyzstan 
26,6 16,4 8,5 
Republic Public Party of 
Kyrgyzstan 
1,6 3,6 19,7 
Social-Democratic party of 
Kyrgyzstan 
10,2 3,9 14,1 
Women Democratic party 6,2 8,2 14,8 
Party Beybechera  4,9 8,9 12,5 
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Agrarian Labor party 1,0 5,6 16,7 
 
Question: According to your opinion, what are relations between state bodies and opposed 
political parties? 
 
Relations In the 
republic, % 
In the region, 
% 
Confronted  23,0 6,9 
Unfriendly 25,9 13,4 
Neutral  14,4 12,8 
Cooperated 14,1 7,9 
 
 
Question: How do you characterize current interethnic relations in the republic and in the 
regions? 
 In the republic, % In the region, % 
Stable  38,0 16,1 
Stable but insignificantly 
confronted 
43,6 29,5 
Uneven, hostile 6,2 6,9 
Hostile, conflicted  2,0 2,0 
Confronted  1,0 1,3 
 
Second part of survey was concentrated on religious problems in the multinational republic.  
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Question: How do you estimate activities of religious organizations in the republic? 
 Islam, 
% 
Christianity, 
% 
Different 
religions, % 
Positively 63,9 36,7 7,9 
Negatively 12,5 13,4 35,1 
In on way 6,6 10,2 5,2 
Difficult to answer 3,9 3,6 8,5 
 
 
 
Question: Which religious organization is active in the Republic and in the regions? 
 Active in 
the region, 
% 
Active in 
the 
republic, 
% 
Not 
active, 
% 
Difficult 
to 
answer, 
% 
Muslims  45,6 43,3 5,9 5,9 
Christians-
Orthodox  
23,9 25,2 5,2 13,4 
Christians-
Protestants  
8,2 7,5 6,9 26,6 
Baptists  15,7 13,1 3,9 21,3 
Bahaists  8,5 7,5 3,3 26,2 
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Svideteli Yegovy 14,4 12,8 2,3 21,6 
Krishnaists  9,5 10,2 2,6 24,9 
 
Question: Is there any possibility of confrontation based on religion differences in the 
future? 
 Yes, % No, % Difficult to 
answer, % 
Between peoples 41,3 11,5 11,5 
Between groups  18,0 19,0 13,4 
Between ethnic 
groups  
15,1 23,6 13,1 
Between states 
(NIS) 
10,2 17,0 18,0 
 
Question: Is there any possibility of confrontation of the nationalities? 
There is no possibility of interethnic conflicts 13,8% 
There is possibility of individual conflicts  51,8% 
There is possibility of interethnic conflicts between 
groups 
21,0% 
There is possibility of interethnic groups between 
masses 
8,5% 
Difficult to answer 3,9% 
 
Question: Which problems’ solution will provide stability in the multinational republic? 
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Equal number of cadres from ethnic groups at state 
bodies 
47,2% 
Advanced responsibility of political parties for 
appearing interethnic tensions and distrusts  
31,5% 
Solving “dual citizenship” 19,0% 
Strengthening bilateral and multilateral economic and 
political ties between Kyrgyzstan and other states  
48,9% 
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APPENDIX C: The Survey of the Third Congress  
June 30, 2000 
In the third congress participated more than 2000 people, only 10% of the participants were 
asked to complete the survey, that is, 208 people participated in the survey. Questions of 
this survey were as follows: 
i. Estimation of the current interethnic relations 
 In the republic, % In the region, % 
Stable 24,0          18,3 
Stable but insignificantly 
confronted 
48,1          26,9 
Uneven, hostile 16,1            9,6 
Hostile and conflicting  4,3            8,7 
Confronted 0,5            1,0 
  
ii. Determination of the main factors (political, socio-economic, legal, 
and lingual-cultural) for stabilizing interethnic relations1. 
Political Sphere: 
- To represent equal number of ethnic cadres at all state bodies –45,7%  (the Russians-57, 
9%; the Uzbeks-83, 3%); 
- To Strength bilateral and multilateral economic and political relations between 
Kyrgyzstan and NIS – 35,6%; 
                                                 
1 In each factors, there were suggestions for stabilizing interethnic relations and percentages of the nationalities 
or people who supported those suggestions.   
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- To enhance legislative measures of all subjects in political spheres for their lighting 
interethnic divisions and distrusts up – 35,1%; 
-   To represent double citizenship – 15,4% (the Russians – 28,9%). 
 
In Socio-Economic Sphere: 
1) Solutions for unemployment – 52,9%; 
2) To increase social defense of the population (pensions, bursaries, and etc.) – 
36,1%; 
3) Solutions for increasing prices and decreasing level of life in the republic – 
33,7% (the Russians – 39,5%); 
4) Solutions for decreasing migration from Kyrgyzstan – 11,1%. 
In Legal Sphere; 
5) To advance criminal and administrative responsibility for displaying 
nationalism and giving offence to national minorities; 
6) To provide all nationalities with equal possibilities in taking high education – 
21,6%; 
7) To provide all nationalities with legal guaranties and mechanisms for 
protecting minority rights – 17,8% (the Russians – 23,7%); 
8) To provide state, and governmental bodies with legal guaranties – 16,3%. 
 
 
 
 
In Lingual-Cultural Sphere: 
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1) Solutions for absence of press, literature, and teaching aids in mother tongues – 
34,6; 
2) Transition of administrative works into the official language – 25,0%,  (the 
Kyrgyzs) – 19,2%; 
3) Restricted education in mother tongues, in particular, for minorities – 18,8%; 
4) Absence of national theaters, art groups and etc. – 8,2%; 
 
iii. Determination of religious situation and level of activities of 
religious organizations. 
Religions Active in 
the 
republic 
      % 
Active in 
the 
region 
     % 
Not 
active 
        
       %  
Difficult 
to 
answer  
     % 
Islam     55,3    44,2     4,8     5,8 
Christianity, 
Orthodox 
    19,7    19,7     4,3     2,9 
Christianity, 
Catholics  
    15,9    18,8     7,0     3,4 
Svideteli Yegovy       8,2    11,5     1,9     6,3 
Bahaism      1,9     3,8     3,8    11,9 
Krishna      2,4     4,8     4,8     7,7 
Baptism      1,0     2,4     5,3   10,1 
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Apart from these religious groups, there is an officially non-registered religious group, 
called Vahhabism.  
The next question was focused on Vahhabism:  
How much Vahhabism is spread in the Republic and in the regions? 
1) Active in the republic – 6,3%; 
2) Active in the regions – 4,3%. 
Among different groups, mainly Russians consider that Vahhabists are active in the 
Republic – 10,5%. 
Moreover, respondents told that estimated activity Vahhabism increased from 20 % to 25% 
of Osh and Jalal-Abad regions.  
Question: under what conditions Kyrgyzstan quickly achieves development? 
a) Remaining multinational - 86,5%; 
b)  Becoming mononational - 8,7%; 
c) Difficult to answer - 2,9%; 
d) Other variants – 0,5%. 
Question: How much is there possibility of interethnic conflicts in the future?  
a) Possibility of individual interethnic conflicts – 41,8%; 
b) Possibility of conflicts between ethnic groups – 30,8% (most of the respondents who 
supported this variant were the Russians - 36,8%, and the Uzbeks – 66,7%); 
c) There is no possibility of interethnic conflicts – 12,5%; 
d) May be mass interethnic conflicts – 10,5% (mostly the Russians). 
Question: who may be a warrant for stability in Kyrgyzstan? 
a) The President of the KR – 76,4%; 
b) Jogorku Kenesh – 12,0%; 
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c) Political Parties – 8,7%; 
d) Constitutional Court – 4,9%; 
e)  Cabinet of Ministers – 1,4%; 
f) Others – 1,9%. 
Question: According to you, who is able to solve ethnic conflicts? 
a) Local power bodies – 11,6%; 
b) State administration – 11,0%; 
c) KPA – 6,9%; 
d) Leaders of local regions, (Aksakaly) – 6,9%. 
 
 
 
